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I. INTRODUCTION
Legal and economic scholars have increasingly drawn attention to
the impact of property rights issues on economic prosperity for Indigenous communities around the world.1 Topics addressed by such scholarship have included inadequate formalization of Indigenous property
rights with resulting disincentivization of land improvements and inability to fully utilize land for credit purposes,2 impacts of unpredict1. See, e.g., HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL: WHY CAPITALISM TRIUMPHS IN THE WEST AND FAILS EVERYWHERE ELSE (2000) (discussing inter alia
how insufficient formalization of property rights may preclude financing arrangements or, more generally, generate insecurities of title that disincentivize investment—in an important work that has had international impact); TOM FLANAGAN,
FRASER INST., CTR. FOR ABORIGINAL STUDIES, CLARITY AND CONFUSION? THE NEW
JURISPRUDENCE OF ABORIGINAL TITLE (2015) (addressing in less detailed form
some of the property rights dimensions discussed in this Article and suggesting
some possible impacts on transaction costs—in a Canadian context specifically).
Some have also considered other economic issues in this context. See also Dwight
Newman, Indigenous Title and Its Contextual Economic Implications: Lessons for
International Law from Canada’s Tsilhqot’in Decision, 109 AM. J. INT’L L. UNBOUND 215 (2015) (considering some economic implications of the court’s recent
Aboriginal title decision while putting forth an argument challenging overly universalized statements of international law on Indigenous rights); Harry Swain &
James Baillie, Tsilhqot’in Nation v. British Columbia: Aboriginal Title and Section 35, 56 CAN. BUS. L.J. 264 (2015) (alluding to some possible economic consequences of recent Aboriginal title decision, albeit in relatively undetailed form).
2. See, e.g., Terry L. Anderson & Dean Lueck, Land Tenure and Agricultural Productivity on Indian Reservations, 35 J.L. & ECON. 427 (1992) (showing empirical
evidence in the context of different tenure systems on different American Indian
reservations). See generally SELF-DETERMINATION: THE OTHER PATH FOR NATIVE
AMERICANS (Terry L. Anderson et. al. eds., 2006); UNLOCKING THE WEALTH OF
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able governance regimes on property rights,3 and the complex variety
of economically inefficient land-holding systems imposed on Indigenous lands in various countries.4 Property rights have impacts on Indigenous communities through effects on the possibilities for
investment within the community,5 and they have impacts on possibilities for Indigenous communities or individuals to contract with
business entities outside the community on matters like resource development.6 When things are not set up right, uncertain systems of
property rights make it difficult to use land and invite opportunities
for increased governmental control.7

3.

4.

5.
6.

7.

INDIAN NATIONS (Terry L. Anderson ed., 2016) [hereinafter UNLOCKING THE
WEALTH].
See, e.g., Terry L. Anderson & Dominic P. Parker, Sovereignty, Credible Commitments and Economic Prosperity on American Indian Reservations, 51 J.L. &
ECON. 641 (2008) (showing empirical evidence of different economic development
as between American Indian reservations subject to different legal systems that
offer greater or fewer guarantees of security to investment); Terry L. Anderson &
Dominic P. Parker, Economic Development Lessons from and for North American
Indian Economics, 53 AUSTL. J. AGRIC. & RESOURCE ECONS. 105 (2009) (offering
further evidence on economic development issues); REBUILDING NATIVE NATIONS:
STRATEGIES FOR GOVERNANCE AND DEVELOPMENT (Mariam Jorgensen ed., 2007)
(discussing impact of governance on economic development); TOM FLANAGAN &
KATRINE BEAUREGARD, FRASER INST., CTR. FOR ABORIGINAL STUDIES, THE WEALTH
OF FIRST NATIONS: AN EXPLORATORY STUDY (2013) (showing the impact of rule of
law variables on the economic prosperity of different First Nations in Canada).
See, e.g., FLANAGAN & BEAUREGARD, supra note 3 (showing impact of private property variables on economic prosperity of different Canadian First Nations); Jessica A. Shoemaker, No Sticks in my Bundle: Rethinking the American Indian
Land Tenure Problem, 63 U. KAN. L. REV. 383 (2015) (discussing the complex
variety of landholding systems on American Indian reservations and showing
how some imposed systems generate significant irrationality and incoherence)
[hereinafter Shoemaker, No Sticks in my Bundle]; see also STUART BANNER, HOW
THE INDIANS LOST THEIR LAND: LAW AND POWER ON THE FRONTIER (2005) (showing
accumulation of legally constructed processes of destruction of effective property
rights for American Indians); Eric Kades, The Dark Side of Efficiency: Johnson v
M’Intosh and the Expropriation of American Indian Lands, 148 U. PA. L. REV.
1065 (2000) (showing how early American case law functioned to support putatively “efficient” expropriation that neglected externalities borne by Indigenous
communities).
See, e.g., Shoemaker, No Sticks in my Bundle, supra note 4.
Cf. MALCOLM LAVOIE & DWIGHT NEWMAN, FRASER INST., MINING AND ABORIGINAL
RIGHTS IN YUKON: HOW CERTAINTY AFFECTS INVESTOR CONFIDENCE (2015) (showing tangible effects on mining-sector investor confidence of uncertainties on scope
of Indigenous rights).
Cf., e.g., Terry L. Anderson, Sovereign Nations or Reservations? An Economic
History of American Indians 14–15 (1995) (explaining that divided systems of
property rights have provided space “for bureaucrats to expand their domains”);
Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition
from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621, 685–87 (1998) [hereinafter Heller,
The Tragedy of the Anticommons] (noting the division of Indian land ownership
ends up creating an anticommons); Steven E. Eagle, Private Property, Development and Freedom: On Taking Our Own Advice, 59 SMU L. REV. 345, 352 (2006)
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These impacts are in the context of compelling, urgent needs to
grow Indigenous economies, with forward-thinking Indigenous scholars like Robert J. Miller having recently highlighted, once again, the
ongoing poverty on the reservation and the ways this poverty fundamentally constrains Indigenous options.8 These limitations often
come from constraints on Indigenous institutions that have undermined their prior economic standing and success.9 They also often
come from the sort of problem Jessica Shoemaker is exploring in her
important and innovative work detailing the deep-seated complexities
in the nature of land ownership on American Indian reservations.10
The focus of this Article will be on Aboriginal title rights held by
Canadian Indigenous communities, but the impacts reflect more general economic theory that has implications for communities elsewhere.
They also have direct practical relevance to Canadian, American, and
other international resource companies hoping to invest in Canada,
which is almost uniquely positioned as a Western democratic state
with truly enormous future resource potential.11 At the same time,
there is a significant current scholarly interest in Indigenous rights at
an international level12 such that ongoing developments may well not

8.
9.

10.

11.

12.

(noting the need for clear laws on property rights to permit individuals to build
their assets); Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in
the Law of Property: The Numerus Clausus Princeiple, 110 YALE L.J. 1 (2000)
(discussing the importance of standardized bundles of property rights so as to
limit information costs in transactions).
See ROBERT J. MILLER, RESERVATION “CAPITALISM”: ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN
INDIAN COUNTRY (Bruce E. Johnson ed., 2012).
See id.; see also UNLOCKING THE WEALTH, supra note 2 (containing various authors showing economic logic of previously existing Indigenous institutions, with
examples including Bruce E. Johnsen showing complex economic functions of the
potlatch in Pacific Northwest cultures).
See, e.g., Jessica A. Shoemaker, Emulsified Property, 43 PEPP. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016); Jessica A. Shoemaker, Like Snow in the Spring Time: Allotment, Fractionation, and the Indian Land Tenure Problem, 2003 WIS. L. REV. 729;
Shoemaker, No Sticks in My Bundle, supra note 4; see also Jessica A. Shoemaker,
Complexity’s Shadow: American Indian Property, Sovereignty, and the Future,
115 MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017) (engaging the complexity of the area somewhat more schematically while seeking to try to find means toward reform that
overcome some of the complexity).
See, e.g., Dwight Newman et al., Arctic Energy Development and Best Practices on
Consultation with Indigenous Peoples, 32 B.U. INT’L L.J. 449 (2014) (noting at
several points literature highlighting Arctic resource potential generally or Canadian resource potential specifically).
See, e.g., S. JAMES ANAYA, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (2d ed.
2004); MAURO BARELLI, SEEKING JUSTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE SIGNIFICANCE AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE UN DECLARATION ON THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS
PEOPLES (2016); KAREN ENGLE, THE ELUSIVE PROMISE OF INDIGENOUS DEVELOPMENT: RIGHTS, CULTURE, STRATEGY (2010); SHERYL LIGHTFOOT, GLOBAL INDIGENOUS POLITICS: A SUBTLE REVOLUTION (2016); BEN SAUL, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES
AND HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL JURISPRUDENCE (2016); REFLECTIONS ON THE UN DECLARATION ON THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES (Ste-
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be confined to any one locale.13 As a result, there is additional reason
for attention to significant developments in a jurisdiction like Canada.
In the particular context that will be the focus of this Article, Canadian courts—and, ultimately, the Supreme Court of Canada—have
been making decisions about the shape of various Indigenous property
rights in recent years. Perhaps most prominently, after a lengthy series of issues in the lower courts,14 the Supreme Court of Canada rendered a major Aboriginal title judgment in June 2014 in favor of the
Tsilhqot’in Nation in central British Columbia,15 thus making the
first-ever judicial declaration of Aboriginal title to specific demarcated
lands in a Canadian court.16 Like some other recent Aboriginal rights
decisions from Canada,17 this decision has already received some international attention18—although it deserves more for reasons including those articulated in this Article.

13.

14.

15.
16.

17.

18.

phen Allen & Alexandra Xanthaki eds., 2011); THE UN DECLARATION ON THE
RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES: A COMMENTARY (Marc Weller & Jessie Hohmann
eds., forthcoming 2017); ALEXANDRA XANTHAKI, INDIGENOUS RIGHTS AND UNITED
NATIONS STANDARDS: SELF-DETERMINATION, CULTURE AND LAND (2007); Kirsty
Gover, Settler-State Political Theory, ‘CANZUS’ and the UN Declaration on the
Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 26 EUR. J. INT’L L. 345 (2015).
See generally P.G. MCHUGH, ABORIGINAL TITLE: THE MODERN JURISPRUDENCE OF
TRIBAL LAND RIGHTS (2011) [hereinafter MCHUGH, ABORIGINAL TITLE] (tracing interactions between different common law states on Aboriginal title); P.G. MCHUGH, ABORIGINAL SOCIETIES AND THE COMMON LAW: A HISTORY OF SOVEREIGNTY,
STATUS, AND SELF-DETERMINATION (2004) (offering a further historical examination that points to transnational dimensions of discourse).
See generally Dwight G. Newman, Tsilhqot’in Nation v. British Columbia and
Civil Justice: Analyzing the Procedural Interaction of Evidentiary Principles and
Aboriginal Oral History, 43 ALTA. L. REV. 433 (2005) (discussing some of the early
decisions on evidentiary issues during the trial proceedings); Dwight Newman &
Danielle Schweitzer, Between Reconciliation and the Rule(s) of Law: Tsilhqot’in
Nation v. British Columbia, 41 U. B.C. L. REV. 249 (2008) (discussing a number of
aspects of the trial judgment).
Tsilhqot’in Nation v. British Columba, [2014] 2 S.C.R. 256 (Can.).
See, e.g., KEN COATES & DWIGHT NEWMAN, MACDONALD LAURIER INST., THE END
IS NOT NIGH: REASON OVER ALARMISM IN ANALYZING THE TSILHQOT’IN DECISION 5
(2014) (noting that it was the first ever declaration of Aboriginal title in a Canadian court and documenting Aboriginal reactions).
See, e.g., Tom Clynes, Victory for Yukon Wilderness is a “Game-Changer”: Historic
Ruling Protects Much of Pristine Peel River Watershed, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC (Dec.
6, 2014), http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2014/12/141206-peel-watershed-yukon-canada-ruling-land-use-planning/ [https://perma.unl.edu/BM8UAKV7] (example of widespread interest by major media sources in some Aboriginal rights determinations in Northern Canada); see also NAOMI KLEIN, THIS
CHANGES EVERYTHING: CAPITALISM VS. THE CLIMATE (2014) (making repeated arguments at various points in the book that Indigenous rights are one of the main
legal mechanisms to be used by environmental activists concerned with issues
such as climate change, thus foreshadowing major future significance to debates
about these Indigenous rights issues).
See, e.g., Paul Vieria, Canada’s High Court Grants Exclusive Property Rights to
Aboriginal Group: Tsilhqot’in Nation Wins Title to Disputed Land in British Co-
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Perhaps less obviously, Canadian courts have also been making decisions about other matters such as the form of water rights held by
Indigenous communities,19 traditional harvesting rights and other
property rights held as Aboriginal rights or as modern treaty rights,20
and the duty-to-consult doctrine and associated claims to accommodations such as resource revenue sharing.21 Thus, there are a range of
Indigenous property rights issues at stake; this Article focuses on the
key title determination from the Tsilhqot’in decision.
The Canadian courts render these decisions in the context of a particular constitutional provision adopted as part of Canada’s major
1982 constitutional amendments.22 The 1982 amendments include
various new constitutional provisions, including an amending
formula,23 clarifications regarding provincial (as opposed to federal)
ownership and jurisdiction over natural resources,24 and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Charter), which is a written bill
of rights contained in sections 1 through 34 of the new Constitution

19.
20.

21.

22.
23.
24.

lumbia, WALL STREET J. (June 26, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/canadashigh-court-grants-exclusive-property-rights-to-aboriginal-group-1403795319 (example of coverage in top echelons of financial press); John Borrows, Aboriginal
Title in Tsilhqot’in v. British Columbia, [2014] SCC 44, MÂORI L. REV. (August
2014), http://maorilawreview.co.nz/2014/08/aboriginal-title-in-tsilhqotin-v-british-columbia-2014-scc-44/ [https://perma.unl.edu/6LP5-JASC] (example of early
publication on the decision in a New Zealand journal).
See, e.g., Saik’uz First Nation v. Rio Tinto Alcan Inc., 2015 BCCA 154 (Can.) (pronouncing explicitly or implicitly on a number of water rights issues in parts of the
judgment), leave to appeal denied, 2015 CarswellBC 2965 (S.C.C. Oct. 15, 2015).
See generally CLAUDIA NOTZKE, ABORIGINAL PEOPLES AND NATURAL RESOURCES IN
CANADA (1994) (discussing a number of different contexts in which Aboriginal
rights or treaty rights might be thought to bear on different resources, discussing
some of the earlier case law and some gaps in this case law).
See generally DWIGHT G. NEWMAN, THE DUTY TO CONSULT: NEW RELATIONSHIPS
WITH ABORIGINAL PEOPLES (Donald Ward ed., 2009) [hereinafter NEWMAN, THE
DUTY TO CONSULT]; DWIGHT G. NEWMAN, REVISITING THE DUTY TO CONSULT ABORIGINAL PEOPLES [hereinafter NEWMAN, REVISITING THE DUTY TO CONSULT] (discussing at length the development of the “duty to consult” jurisprudence and its
tendencies to foster such discussions as those on resource revenue sharing).
Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c 11 (U.K.)
[hereinafter Constitution Act, 1982].
Id. pt. V, §§ 38–49; see also JAMES ROSS HURLEY, AMENDING CANADA’S CONSTITUTION: HISTORY, PROCESSES, PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS (1996) (detailing the
lengthy multi-decade quest for an amending formula).
Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., c 3 (U.K.), reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, app II,
no 5 (Can.), pt. VI, § 92A [hereinafter “Constitution Act, 1867”] (adding section to
adjust division of powers with clearer recognition of provincial authority over natural resources); see also J. PETER MEEKISON ET AL., ORIGINS AND MEANINGS OF
SECTION 92A: THE 1982 CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT ON RESOURCES (1985) (offering a historical perspective on the section); DWIGHT NEWMAN, NATURAL RESOURCE JURISDICTION IN CANADA (2013) [hereinafter NEWMAN, NATURAL
RESOURCE JURISDICTION] (offering an integrated account of section 92A along
with other constitutional provisions affecting management of natural resources
in Canada).
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Act, 1982.25 Immediately following the Charter, section 35(1) of the
Constitution Act, 1982 contains a further rights provision, with the
statement that “[t]he existing aboriginal and treaty rights of the aboriginal peoples of Canada are hereby recognized and affirmed.”26
Section 35, the Aboriginal rights provision, is not detailed and
therefore leaves a great deal of room for judicial interpretation.27 In
the context of determinations on Indigenous property rights, the Canadian courts have increasingly used constitutional reasoning about
the purposes of section 35 in articulating the scope and limits of these
property rights.28
The main claims of this Article are threefold: First, that the Indigenous property rights created by Canadian courts in recent years have
a variety of economic characteristics that may undermine their value
compared to rights that might have simply been differently articulated. Second, that the way in which these particular property rights
are developed in the courts differs from traditional common law methodologies in particular ways that lead the courts to attain these outcomes rather than an economically efficient design of property rights.
And, third, that there are a variety of policy routes forward that could
help to promote the development of more economically functional
property rights for Canadian Indigenous communities.
Although the particular claims are developed in terms of the Canadian jurisprudence of Indigenous rights, the concluding section will
also try to show that this study has wider implications on several different issues—notably, questions related to appropriate engagement
25. Constitution Act, 1982 pt. I, §§ 1–34. See also CANADIAN CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND
FREEDOMS (Errol Mendes & Stéphane Beaulac eds., 5th ed. 2013) (significant collection of essays on different aspects of the Charter); GUY RÉGIMBALD & DWIGHT
NEWMAN, THE LAW OF THE CANADIAN CONSTITUTION (1st ed. 2013) (treatise offering integrated account of the Charter as part of Canadian constitutional law
generally).
26. Constitution Act, 1982 pt. II, § 35(1). See generally, Kiera Ladner, An Indigenous
Constitutional Paradox: Both Monumental Achievement and Monumental Defeat,
in PATRIATION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES: CONSTITUTION MAKING IN CANADA 267
(Lois Harder & Steve Patten eds., 2015) (tracing some of the aspirations and results of section 35).
27. Cf. PATRICK MACKLEM, INDIGENOUS DIFFERENCE AND THE CONSTITUTION OF CANADA 13–23 (2001) (putting a number of arguments for theory-influenced approaches to interpretation of constitutional Aboriginal rights).
28. See, e.g., Mikisew Cree First Nation v. Canada (Minister of Canadian Heritage),
[2005] 3 S.C.R. 388, para. 1 (Can.) (explaining that purposes of reconciliation are
central to interpretation of various aspects of Aboriginal rights); FELIX HOEHN,
RECONCILING SOVEREIGNTIES: ABORIGINAL NATIONS AND CANADA (2012) (trying to
show paradigm shifts in theoretical concepts animating interpretation); JAMIE D.
DICKSON, THE HONOUR AND DISHONOUR OF THE CROWN: MAKING SENSE OF ABORIGINAL LAW IN CANADA (2015) (showing the Supreme Court of Canada organizing its
jurisprudence around particular purposive concepts, such as honour of the
Crown).
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with Indigenous property rights in other contexts and questions related to when there are exceptions to the general proposition that common law judicial interpretation of property rights leads to
economically well-structured rights.
II. THE NATURE OF ABORIGINAL TITLE WITHIN THE
CANADIAN JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION
A.

Background

As noted, the 1982 constitutional provision “recognizes and affirms” specifically “existing aboriginal and treaty rights.”29 Whether
or not the drafters realized it at the time, this provision would come to
encompass a right to Aboriginal title in areas where Indigenous communities had not surrendered land through treaties, in the way that
the doctrine of Aboriginal title has grown in common law jurisdictions
around the world.30
In a 1973 case brought by the Nisga’s community, Calder v. British
Columbia, the Supreme Court of Canada recognized, in principle, the
idea of Aboriginal title being part of the common law.31 Although six
of the seven justices sitting in the case recognized Aboriginal title in
principle, the Nisga’a lost on the facts of the case from a combination
of three of the seven justices holding their title to have been extinguished by past government action and one further justice holding the
case to have procedural defects such that it was unnecessary to rule
on the substantive issues.32
The case did not result in any declaration of Aboriginal title for the
Nisga’a, but it set the stage for negotiations with them and other Aboriginal communities on the basis of recognized rights: the Nisga’a ultimately concluded a treaty under which they have self-governmental
powers and forms of land ownership, including the ability to create
individualized property rights and even to establish a Torrens landregistry system.33
29. Constitution Act, 1982 pt. II, § 35(1).
30. See, e.g., KENT MCNEIL, COMMON LAW ABORIGINAL TITLE (1989) (articulating common law foundations for Aboriginal-title doctrine); MCHUGH, ABORIGINAL TITLE,
supra note 13 (tracing the jurisprudential history of the development of the doctrine of Aboriginal title); ULLA SECHER, ABORIGINAL CUSTOMARY LAW: A SOURCE
OF COMMON LAW TITLE TO LAND (2014) (tracing a shift in some jurisdictions in the
conception of the origins of Aboriginal title to root it in Indigenous legal systems’
property rights).
31. Calder v. British Columbia, [1973] S.C.R. 313 (Can.).
32. Id. (Judson, J., writing for three justices holding extinguishment and Pigeon, J.,
writing alone on technical points, together outnumbering the three justices for
whom Hall, J., wrote).
33. Justine Hunter, Land Ownership Changes Mark New Chapter in Nisga’a History,
GLOBE & MAIL (May 14, 2010), http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/british-co
lumbia/land-ownership-changes-mark-new-chapter-in-nisgaa-history/article4353
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More broadly, the Calder case concerning the title claim of the
Nisga’a showed that Aboriginal title continued to exist, in principle, in
areas where land had not been surrendered through historic treaties—which included most of British Columbia as well as most of the
three Northern territories, much of Quebec, and the Maritime provinces.34 The result was that Aboriginal title became a constitutionalized property right across significant parts of Canada in 1982,35 with
Aboriginal title claims having been settled in only some of these regions since then and outstanding Aboriginal title claims remaining
over most of British Columbia and the Maritimes, along with some
smaller claims elsewhere.36
Subsequent Aboriginal title cases analyzed Aboriginal title, to
some extent, through that constitutional lens, with the next major Aboriginal title case at the Supreme Court of Canada, the 1997 Delgamuukw decision,37 seeking to develop an Aboriginal title test that
consisted of a specific application of the broader Aboriginal rights test
that the court had developed the prior year in its 1996 Van der Peet

34.

35.

36.
37.

118/ [https://perma.unl.edu/99S2-PAJS] (discussing private ownership of homes
within Nisga’a territory); Tristin Hopper, B.C. First Nation Leads Historic and
Controversial Move Toward Aboriginal Private Home Ownership, NAT’L POST
(Nov. 8, 2013), http://news.nationalpost.com/news/canada/b-c-first-nation-leadshistoric-and-controversial-move-toward-aboriginal-private-home-ownership
[https://perma.unl.edu/C5TP-RVGM] (describing titling of first three homes); cf.
Diane Cragg, Best Practices in First Nations Land Title Systems: Considerations
for Improving Land Title Certainty on First Nations Lands, FIRST NATIONS TAX
COMMISSION (2007) (land registrar of Nisga’a Nation exploring benefits of Torrens
system). But see Jack Woodward, Converting the Communal Aboriginal Interest
into Private Property: Sarnia, Osoyoos, the Nisga’a Treaty and Other Recent Developments, in BEYOND THE NASS VALLEY: NATIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE DELGAMUUKW DECISION 93 (Owen Lippert ed., 2000) (raising complications if parts of
the Nisga’a lands are still subject to claims by other Aboriginal communities for
joint title).
See THOMAS ISAAC, ABORIGINAL LAW: COMMENTARY AND ANALYSIS 144, 161–86
(noting treaties in Maritimes did not explicitly extinguish title and discussing
areas where modern treaties had to be negotiated or continue under negotiation).
Id. at 86 (“[p]rior to 1982, Aboriginal rights, including Aboriginal title, could be
extinguished by a clear federal legislative act; however that is no longer possible . . . since 1982, Aboriginal title can no longer be unilaterally extinguished by
the federal Crown”); R. v. Marshall; R. v. Bernard, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 220, para. 39
(Can.) [hereinafter Marshall and Bernard] (stating similarly that “[p]rior to constitutionalization of aboriginal rights in 1982, aboriginal title could be extinguished by clear legislative act (see Van der Peet, at para. 125). Now that is not
possible. The Crown can impinge on aboriginal title only if it can establish that
this is justified in pursuance of a compelling and substantial legislative objective
for the good of larger society: R. v. Sparrow, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075, at p. 1113. This
process can be seen as a way of reconciling aboriginal interests with the interests
of the broader community.”).
ISAAC, supra note 34, at 144, 162–65 (discussing claims in the Maritimes and
British Columbia).
Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010 (Can.).
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decision.38 The essentially public-law nature of the court’s reasoning
is worth highlighting, as it sets the stage for the reasoning in the subsequent jurisprudence. The Van der Peet decision, which considered a
claimed Aboriginal right in respect of certain fishing activities, saw
the court articulate a general test for the identification of constitutionally entrenched Aboriginal rights.39 Essentially, this test was a cultural-rights test that looked for specific practices and activities that
were culturally distinctive to a particular community and had commenced in some form prior to contact with European settlers.40 The
protection, as confirmed by later case law, extends to logical evolutions from those historical practices,41 but the test does focus in certain respects on evidence of historical cultural practices and
activities.42 The test came from theoretical reasoning about what
kinds of practices could reasonably be thought to be legal rights that
survived the application of European sovereignty. Specifically, the
court focused on these rights as “Aboriginal” rights flowing from prior
presence43 and what legal rights advance the purpose of the constitutional Aboriginal-rights guarantee, which the court increasingly characterizes in terms of “reconciliation.”44
The Delgamuukw decision on Aboriginal title was essentially an
application of the Van der Peet theory and test to the specific context

38.
39.
40.
41.

R. v. Van der Peet, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507 (Can.).
Id.
Id. para. 45 (explaining the “integral to a distinctive culture” test).
Lax Kw’alaams Indian Band v. Canada (Attorney General), [2011] 3 S.C.R. 535
(Can.).
42. See generally Russell L. Barsh & James Youngblood Henderson, The Supreme
Court’s Van der Peet Trilogy: Naı̈ve Imperialsm and Ropes of Sand, 42 MCGILL
L.J. 993 (1997) (characterizing the test and identifying its tendencies to freeze
rights based on their historical form); Avigail Eisenberg, Reasoning About Identity: Canada’s Distinctive Culture Test, in DIVERSITY AND EQUALITY: THE CHANGING FRAMEWORK OF FREEDOM IN CANADA 34 (Avigail Eisenberg ed., 2006)
(exploring the test from a philosophical standpoint).
43. See Van der Peet, [1996] 2 S.C.R. at paras. 111–12 (offering basic explanation of
the survival of Aboriginal title claims and Aboriginal rights generally as based on
historical occupation and use of lands) (drawing on André Émond, Le sable dans
l’engrenage du droit inherent des autochtones à l’autonomie gouvernementale, 30
REVUE JURIDIQUE THÉMIS 89 (1996)).
44. See Van der Peet, 2 S.C.R. at para. 31 (stating that “the aboriginal rights recognized and affirmed by s. 35(1) must be directed towards the reconciliation of the
pre-existence of aboriginal societies with the sovereignty of the Crown”). See generally Dwight G. Newman, Reconciliation: Legal Conception(s) and Faces of Justice, in MOVING TOWARD JUSTICE: LEGAL TRADITIONS AND ABORIGINAL JUSTICE 80
(John D. Whyte ed., 2008) [hereinafter Newman, Reconciliation: Legal Conception(s)] (charting growing and shifting use of concept of reconciliation in Supreme
Court of Canada jurisprudence on Aboriginal rights).
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of Aboriginal title.45 Where a particular community had exclusive occupation of particular territories prior to the assertion of sovereignty
by European settlers,46 rather than just a non-exclusive use of land
that translated into an Aboriginal right,47 the exclusive occupation
now survived as Aboriginal title.48 In other words, Aboriginal title
ends up translating a prior cultural community’s exclusive occupation
into a modern property right, based on a cultural-rights approach
adopted within broad constitutional purposes of reconciliation.49
The broad doctrinal features of the Delgmauukw decision continue
forward in the 2014 Tsilhqot’in decision,50 with the main test in
Tsilhqot’in being based on Delgamuukw.51 However, Tsilhqot’in also
implicitly responds to an intervening decision, the Supreme Court of
Canada’s 2005 Marshall and Bernard decision.52 That specific decision was seen by some to say that historically mobile Aboriginal communities could not meet the terms of the Aboriginal title test.53 In its
very result, the Tsilhqot’in decision makes clear that they can.
B.

The Aboriginal Title Test

What is interesting now is the shape of the Aboriginal title test
that emerges from Tsilhqot’in, which actually requires significant doctrinal exposition and analysis for a proper understanding of a number
of elements of the test. As in Delgamuukw, the basic test looks to
whether an Aboriginal community had sufficient, exclusive occupation
of land prior to the assertion of European sovereignty in the pertinent
45. Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010, para. 142 (Can.) (referring to the case as engaging in “[t]he adaptation of the test laid down in Van der
Peet to suit claims to title . . . .”).
46. Id. para. 143.
47. Id. para. 159 (“[I]f aboriginals can show that they occupied a particular piece of
land, but did not do so exclusively, it will always be possible to establish aboriginal rights short of title.”).
48. Id. para. 155 (explaining the relationship between exclusive Aboriginal occupation and title today in the following terms: “Exclusivity, as an aspect of aboriginal
title, vests in the aboriginal community which holds the ability to exclude others
from the lands held pursuant to that title. The proof of title must, in this respect,
mirror the content of the right.”).
49. Marshall and Bernard, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 220, para. 58 (Can.) (“It follows from the
requirement of exclusive occupation that exploiting the land, rivers or seaside for
hunting, fishing or other resources may translate into aboriginal title to the land
if the activity was sufficiently regular and exclusive to comport with title at common law”).
50. See Tsilhqot’in Nation v. British Columba, [2014] 2 S.C.R. 256 (Can.); Delgamuukw, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010.
51. Tsilhqot’in, [2014] 2 S.C.R. 256.
52. Marshall and Bernard, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 220.
53. See, e.g., Kent McNeil, Aboriginal Title and the Supreme Court: What’s Happening?, 69 SASK. L. REV. 281 (2006) [hereinafter McNeil, Aboriginal Title];
RÉGIMBALD & NEWMAN, supra note 25, at 791–94.
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part of Canada.54 In addition to sufficiency of occupation and exclusivity of occupation, the test can involve looking to continuity of occupation if present occupation is used as part of the evidence for past
occupation.55
The test also looks implicitly to whether a current Aboriginal community is the valid successor to a particular Aboriginal title claim.
Although that matter has tended to be less discussed, it became a
question in an interesting way in Tsilhqot’in. While the issue did not
continue to be a matter for discussion at the Supreme Court of Canada
level, in the lower courts there was an issue as to whether the title
claim should be pursued by the Tsilhqot’in Nation as the claimant,
which had initially been commenced by one of the member groups
within the Tsilhqot’in, the Xeni Gwetin. The Tsilhqot’in claim amalgamated six legal First Nations, the modern legal entities, back into a
historically rooted group and thereby also avoided the problem of overlapping claims by these modern legal entities.56 The lower courts
were ready to recognize the Tsilhqot’in Nation as the rights-bearing
community for the purposes of the title claim.57 This aspect of the
case may highlight strategic considerations pertinent in other Aboriginal rights claims. It also highlights the possibility of questions being
raised about whether the particular claimant to appear before the
courts is the proper successor to a title-holding group.
Returning to the key components of the test, the Tsilhqot’in decision, while applying Delgamuukw, does not simply restate it. In its
result, it makes clear the appropriateness of a particular application
of Delgamuukw, being one that makes it possible for historically mobile Aboriginal communities to succeed in title claims. It does so
through its reading of the sufficiency and exclusivity requirements. In
respect of sufficiency of occupation, the court in Tsilhqot’in actually
appears to respond to some criticisms of its past decision in the intervening case of Marshall and Bernard.58 Marshall and Bernard had
been an application of Delgamuukw in the context of an unsuccessful
54. Tsilhqot’in, [2014] 2 S.C.R. at para. 25 (working to apply the past test, stating
that “the Delgamuukw test for Aboriginal title to land is based on ‘occupation’
prior to assertion of European sovereignty. To ground Aboriginal title this occupation must possess three characteristics. It must be sufficient; it must be continuous (where present occupation is relied on); and it must be exclusive.” (emphasis
in original)).
55. Id. para. 46 (“Continuity simply means that for evidence of present occupation to
establish an inference of pre-sovereignty occupation, the present occupation must
be rooted in pre-sovereignty times. This is a question for the trier of fact in each
case.”).
56. See Newman & Schweitzer, supra note 14 (discussing this aspect).
57. Id.
58. Marshall and Bernard, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 220 (Can.). See, e.g., McNeil, Aboriginal
Title, supra note 53 (offering significant criticism of cases as blocking possibility
of claims by historically mobile communities).
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Aboriginal title claim in Nova Scotia. When analyzing the combined
sufficiency and occupation branches, the court had ended up looking
for “regular and exclusive”59 occupation to meet the common law standards, specifically suggesting that seasonal use of land for hunting or
fishing would most plausibly ground an Aboriginal hunting or fishing
right rather than full ownership of the land.60 The court did not engage in a separate discussion of the requirements of sufficiency but
used the sufficiency aspect to lead in to the exclusive occupation discussion.61 In discussing sufficiency, it referenced some past case law
trying to show the flexibility of the idea of sufficiency, but with some of
that past case law referencing the adverse possession context.62
In Tsilhqot’in, presumably aware of criticisms of the substance or
at least the optics of equating Aboriginal possessors to adverse possessors, the court is concerned that the sufficiency standard not be
equated with the standard at Canadian common law for proof of adverse possession.63 Indeed, it actually turns explicitly to one of the
judgments from the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal in Marshall and Bernard64 whose standard it had previously rejected in its own judgment
in that case:
59.
60.
61.
62.

Marshall and Bernard, [2005] 2 S.C.R. at para. 58.
Id.
Id. paras. 54–58.
Id. para. 54 (“One of these rights is aboriginal title to land. It is established by
aboriginal practices that indicate possession similar to that associated with title
at common law. In matching common law property rules to aboriginal practice
we must be sensitive to the context-specific nature of common law title, as well as
the aboriginal perspective. The common law recognizes that possession sufficient
to ground title is a matter of fact, depending on all the circumstances, in particular the nature of the land and the manner in which the land is commonly enjoyed:
Powell v. McFarlane (1977), 38 P. & C.R. 452 (Ch. D.), at p. 471. For example,
where marshy land is virtually useless except for shooting, shooting over it may
amount to adverse possession: Red House Farms (Thorndon) Ltd. v. Catchpole,
[1977] E.G.D. 798 (Eng. C.A.). The common law also recognizes that a person
with adequate possession for title may choose to use it intermittently or sporadically: Keefer v. Arillotta (1976), 13 O.R. (2d) 680 (C.A.), per Wilson J.A. Finally,
the common law recognizes that exclusivity does not preclude consensual arrangements that recognize shared title to the same parcel of land: Delgamuukw,
at para. 158.”).
63. Tsilhqot’in Nation v. British Columba, [2014] 2 S.C.R. 256, para. 38 (Can.) (“To
sufficiently occupy the land for purposes of title, the Aboriginal group in question
must show that it has historically acted in a way that would communicate to
third parties that it held the land for its own purposes. This standard does not
demand notorious or visible use akin to proving a claim for adverse possession,
but neither can the occupation be purely subjective or internal. There must be
evidence of a strong presence on or over the land claimed, manifesting itself in
acts of occupation that could reasonably be interpreted as demonstrating that the
land in question belonged to, was controlled by, or was under the exclusive stewardship of the claimant group.”).
64. R. v. Marshall; R v. Bernard, [2003] 218 N.S.R. 2d 78 (Can.), rev’d, [2005] 2 S.C.R.
220 (Can.).
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In R. v. Marshall, 2003 NSCA 105, 218 N.S.R. (2d) 78, at paras. 135–38,
Cromwell J.A. (as he then was), in reasoning I adopt, likens the sufficiency of
occupation required to establish Aboriginal title to the requirements for general occupancy at common law. A general occupant at common law is a person
asserting possession of land over which no one else has a present interest or
with respect to which title is uncertain.65

As an aside, Justice Cromwell later sat on the Supreme Court of Canada panel unanimously supporting Chief Justice McLachlin’s
Tsilhqot’in opinion.
Canadian property law scholars consider the standard of common
law general occupation poorly defined.66 Perhaps with knowledge of
that issue, the court went on to adopt, through Justice Cromwell’s
Court of Appeal opinion, some of the statements by Kent McNeil on
the expected standard of occupation. First of all, it references Justice
Cromwell ’s explicit adoption of a passage from McNeil’s seminal book,
Common Law Aboriginal Title:
What, then, did one have to do to acquire a title by occupancy? . . . [I]t appears
. . . that . . . a casual entry, such as riding over land to hunt or hawk, or
travelling across it, did not make an occupant, such acts “being only transitory
and to a particular purpose, which leaves no marks of an appropriation, or of
an intention to possess for the separate use of the rider.” There must, therefore, have been an actual entry, and some act or acts from which an intention
to occupy the land could be inferred. Significantly, the acts and intention had
to relate only to the occupation—it was quite unnecessary for a potential occupant to claim, or even wish to acquire, the vacant estate, for the law cast it
upon him by virtue of his occupation alone . . . .
Further guidance on what constitutes occupation can be gained from cases
involving land to which title is uncertain. Generally, any acts on or in relation
to land that indicate an intention to hold or use it for one’s own purposes are
evidence of occupation. Apart from the obvious, such as enclosing, cultivating,
mining, building upon, maintaining, and warning trespassers off land, any
number of other acts, including cutting trees or grass, fishing in tracts of
water, and even perambulation, may be relied upon. The weight given to such
acts depends partly on the nature of the land, and the purposes for which it
can reasonably be used.67

There are some interpretive challenges with this description. While
the early lines of the passage suggest that mere travel across land
would never be sufficient to amount to occupation, the later passage
underlined by the Supreme Court of Canada refers to “even perambulation” as potentially grounding sufficient occupation, and dictionary
definitions of “perambulation” make clear that it consists simply of
travelling across, perhaps especially by walking in some official act of
65. Tsilhqot’in, [2014] 2 S.C.R. at para. 39.
66. See, e.g., Alex M. Cameron, The Absurdity of Aboriginal Title After Tsilquot’in, 44
ADVOC. Q. 28 (2015). I am grateful for discussions with Bruce Ziff on this point.
67. Tsilhqot’in, [2014] 2 S.C.R. at para. 39 (emphasis added by Supreme Court of
Canada) (quoting MCNEIL, supra note 30, at 198–200).
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demarcation68—admittedly potentially distinguishable from the “riding over land to hunt or hawk” that serves as the image in the early
lines, but only by the drawing of hairline distinctions that begin to
break down common sense. That said, the idea that the acts could
depend on the nature of the land is fully sensible, and one could thus
read the judgment as explicitly adopting the common law general occupation standard.
However, it is frankly not clear that either of the judgments in
question actually adopted that standard. No sooner does one see that
first McNeil passage as an explanation of general occupation (with the
peculiar perambulation paradox, as referenced) than both judgments
reference further statements from McNeil:
Cromwell J.A. in Marshall went on to state that this standard is different
from the doctrine of constructive possession. The goal is not to attribute possession in the absence of physical acts of occupation, but to define the quality
of the physical acts of occupation that demonstrate possession at law (para.
137). He concluded:
I would adopt, in general terms, Professor McNeil’s analysis that the appropriate standard of occupation, from the common law perspective, is the middle
ground between the minimal occupation which would permit a person to sue a
wrong-doer in trespass and the most onerous standard required to ground title by adverse possession as against a true owner . . . . Where, as here, we are
dealing with a large expanse of territory which was not cultivated, acts such
as continual, though changing, settlement and wide-ranging use for fishing,
hunting and gathering should be given more weight than they would be if
dealing with enclosed, cultivated land. Perhaps most significantly, . . . it is
impossible to confine the evidence to the very precise spot on which the cutting was done: Pollock and Wright at p. 32. Instead, the question must be
whether the acts of occupation in particular areas show that the whole area
was occupied by the claimant. [para. 138].69

The standard is now not said to be the ill-defined general occupation
standard but the potentially even more challenging standard of “the
middle ground between the minimal occupation which would permit a
person to sue a wrong-doer in trespass and the most onerous standard
required to ground title by adverse possession as against a true
owner.”70 All of this is of course technical, but the court sets out to
define the common law standard technically and, quite simply, fails to
do so in one coherent, cohesive way. So, the judgment probably gives a
general sense of what might be “sufficient” common law occupation,
but it does not do so particularly precisely at all. That may be just as
well, as any common law description would be complicated by the con68. See, e.g., Perambulate, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2005) (including “[t]o
travel through and inspect (a territory) so as to measure it, divide it, or determine
its ownership; to survey by passing through; . . . to walk in procession around the
boundaries of (a forest, manor, parish, etc.) for the purpose of formally determining or preserving them”).
69. Tsilhqot’in, [2014] 2 S.C.R. at para. 40.
70. Id.
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sideration that it must also be considered in light of weight also given
to Aboriginal perspectives.71
The result in the case is that the court is ready, in at least some
circumstances, to consider even seasonal hunting, fishing, or trapping
sufficient use of land to ground an Aboriginal title claim.72 That claim
seems to contradict its suggestion in Marshall and Bernard that seasonal use of land for hunting or fishing would more likely ground an
Aboriginal hunting or fishing right but not title.73 The natural reading is that the court implicitly overturned Marshall and Bernard—the
court denies that it did so,74 but sub silentio overturning of precedents
has been part of the modus operandi of the Supreme Court of Canada
as of late.75 Although on its face the Aboriginal title test has remained stable, there is reason to think that the underlying meaning of
the test has actually been changing, with that conclusion surely implying a degree of legal uncertainty for those seeking to apply it in any
sensible way or to predict its future application.
The exclusivity component of the test is to be “understood in the
sense of intention and capacity to control the land,”76 and there has
always been agreement that such intention is not disturbed by a consensual passage onto the land by others when permission is granted
71. Id. para. 41 (“The common law test for possession—which requires an intention
to occupy or hold land for the purposes of the occupant—must be considered
alongside the perspective of the Aboriginal group which, depending on its size
and manner of living, might conceive of possession of land in a somewhat different manner than did the common law.”).
72. Id. para. 42 (“There is no suggestion in the jurisprudence or scholarship that Aboriginal title is confined to specific village sites or farms, as the Court of Appeal
held. Rather, a culturally sensitive approach suggests that regular use of territories for hunting, fishing, trapping and foraging is ‘sufficient’ use to ground Aboriginal title, provided that such use, on the facts of a particular case, evinces an
intention on the part of the Aboriginal group to hold or possess the land in a
manner comparable to what would be required to establish title at common
law.”).
73. Marshall and Bernard, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 220, para. 58 (Can.).
74. Tsilhqot’in, [2014] 2 S.C.R. at paras. 43–44 (claiming that Marshall and Bernard
did not create a territorial approach to title and did not preclude title claims by
nomadic or semi-nomadic groups). But see also Marshall and Bernard, [2005] 2
S.C.R. at para. 110 (LeBel, J., concurring) (warning the court that its statement
of the law was apt to be read as precluding title claims by nomadic or semi-nomadic groups and arguing for a different statement of the test); Dwight Newman,
Aboriginal Rights, Collective Rights and Adjudicative Virtues, in THE DIGNITY OF
LAW: THE LEGACY OF JUSTICE LOUIS LEBEL 285 (Dwight Newman & Malcolm
Thorburn eds., 2015) [hereinafter Newman, Aboriginal Rights, Collective Rights]
(discussing Justice LeBel’s foresight on this and other points in his Aboriginal
law jurisprudence).
75. See, e.g., Dwight Newman, Judicial Method and Three Gaps in the Supreme
Court of Canada’s Assisted Suicide Judgment in Carter, 78 SASK. L. REV. 217
(2015).
76. Tsilhqot’in, [2014] 2 S.C.R. at para. 48.
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for such passage.77 In Tsilhqot’in, the Supreme Court of Canada appears to rely on facts found in this respect by the trial judge, stating
quickly that:
The trial judge found that the Tsilhqot’in, prior to the assertion of sovereignty,
repelled other people from their land and demanded permission from outsiders who wished to pass over it. He concluded from this that the Tsilhqot’in
treated the land as exclusively theirs. There is no basis upon which to disturb
that finding.78

Those findings are far less clear in the trial judgment than implied in
this statement. The trial judge found that the Tsilhqot’in made seasonal use of certain lands prior to the assertion of European sovereignty,79 and he referenced general military encounters with other
Indigenous communities outside the claim area and the Tsilhqot’in repelling European settlers from some spots in the last few years prior
to the 1846 assertion of sovereignty.80 However, it is not clear that
the trial judge’s findings rise to the challenge posed by Marshall and
Bernard to show that seasonally used sites could not have been used
by others in between the seasonal uses.81 The result is that the court
must be read as also having accepted some shift in the demands in the
exclusivity branch.
The Tsilhqot’in decision has made Aboriginal title claims viable for
historically mobile Aboriginal communities. Despite first appearances
of it being an application of the Delgamuukw test, it has not done so,
however, without changing the law. It must be understood as having
effected a significant shift in the sufficiency standard and at least
some shift in the exclusivity standard as compared to the way the Supreme Court of Canada regarded these standards in its last Aboriginal
title decision, one decade ago. It may amount simply to a retreat from
what it now regards as an erroneous application of Delgamuukw in
Marshall and Bernard. In any event, it has effected a significant
shift.
One could frame an argument that shifting standards within the
test for establishing Aboriginal title themselves pose a form of economic problem through the legal uncertainty that they create. That
claim might not be misplaced in that they undermine an assessment
of whether the circumstances of a particular community do or do not
ground a significant property right for that community. Admittedly
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

See id.; Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010, para. 56 (Can.).
Tsilhqot’in, [2014] 2 S.C.R. at para. 58.
Tsilhqot’in Nation v. British Columbia, 2007 BCSC 1700, para. 948 (Can.).
Id. paras. 219–54.
Marshall and Bernard, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 220, para. 58 (Can.) (“[A]boriginal peoples
asserted and proved ancestral utilization of particular sites for fishing and harvesting the products of the sea. Their forebears had come back to the same place
to fish or harvest each year since time immemorial. However, the season over,
they left, and the land could be traversed and used by anyone. These facts gave
rise not to aboriginal title, but to aboriginal hunting and fishing rights.”).
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with this, as with some other aspects, it is also fair to recognize that
the judges deciding these cases are in a challenging position of trying
to develop a doctrine with highly complex features in a highly charged
environment. So, these shifting standards without a doubt undermine
certainty, but it is not clear whether judges could easily do better or
whether they are ultimately subject to institutional limitations and
constraints that make this dimension of uncertainty practically
unavoidable.
C.

The Contents of Aboriginal Title

As has developed within the international jurisprudence on the
doctrine of Aboriginal title,82 the Canadian approach to Aboriginal title sees it as a burden on the radical or underlying title that the
Crown acquired at the moment of the assertion of sovereignty.83
Aboriginal title [then] confers ownership rights similar to those associated
with fee simple, including: the right to decide how the land will be used; the
right of enjoyment and occupancy of the land; the right to possess the land;
the right to the economic benefits of the land; and the right to pro-actively use
and manage the land.84

This statement comes immediately after a restatement of the
court’s long-standing position that Aboriginal title “is not equated
with fee simple ownership; nor can it be described with reference to
traditional property law concepts.”85 The inherent tension between
the two statements—one analogizing to fee simple and the other denying any equation with fee simple—manifests the court’s challenge in
describing the concept of Aboriginal title, which it sees as arising out
of the relationship between the new State and pre-existing Aboriginal
societies after the assertion of European sovereignty.86 However, the
82. See generally MCHUGH, ABORIGINAL TITLE, supra note 13 (comprehensive account
of international development of Aboriginal title jurisprudence); SECHER, supra
note 30 (more argument-oriented account on place of Indigenous legal traditions
in shaping title, but with extensive comparative work figuring within her
discussion).
83. Tsilhqot’in Nation v. British Columba, [2014] 2 S.C.R. 256, para. 69 (Can.).
84. Id. para. 73.
85. Id. para. 72 (“Analogies to other forms of property ownership—for example, fee
simple—may help us to understand aspects of Aboriginal title. But they cannot
dictate precisely what it is or is not. As La Forest J. put it in Delgamuukw, at
para. 190, Aboriginal title ‘is not equated with fee simple ownership; nor can it be
described with reference to traditional property law concepts.’ ”).
86. Id. para. 72; cf. Brian Slattery, Understanding Aboriginal Rights, 66 CAN. BAR
REV. 727 (1987); R. v. Van der Peet, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507, para. 19 (Can.) (stating
that “Aboriginal rights cannot, however, be defined on the basis of the philosophical precepts of the liberal enlightenment. Although equal in importance and significance to the rights enshrined in the Charter, aboriginal rights must be viewed
differently from Charter rights because they are rights held only by aboriginal
members of Canadian society. They arise from the fact that aboriginal people are
aboriginal.”).
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court’s adopted position does appear to see the property right dimension of Aboriginal title as having much of the content of fee simple
ownership, albeit also containing both more and less than fee simple.
Fee simple, in its origins, refers via the term “fee” to the “use of
land,” and via the term “simple” to that use being unconstrained in
terms of unrestricted inheritance by heirs and in terms of alienability
through unrestricted transfer of ownership.87 Although there are
senses in which the fee simple owner “manages” the land, the term
referring to “the right to pro-actively use and manage the land”—distinct from “the right to decide how the land will be used” —arguably
sits more naturally as a description of the powers of a government.
For instance, the term “manage” appears in the constitutional description of the legislative powers of provincial governments in relation to
non-renewable natural resources88 and of the legislative powers of
provincial governments in relation to public lands.89 Indeed, on a
close attention to the text of the judgment, there is an argument to be
made that the description of the incidents of Aboriginal title actually
encompasses an implicit suggestion as to a public-style jurisdiction as
opposed to only a private ownership of the lands in question.90 Thus,
in some respects, it may go well beyond the contents of fee simple,
although understanding its contents is not straightforward and may
give rise to significant further uncertainties. At the same time, the
expansive enumerated contents of Aboriginal title mask the next dimension of the court’s opinion, which imposes a number of limits on
Aboriginal title that make its contents less than those of fee simple
ownership.
D.

Inherent Limits on the Scope of Aboriginal Title

The extended discussion of Aboriginal title in the Delgamuukw decision included the elaboration of an “inherent limit” on the scope of
Aboriginal title.91 As explained in that decision, this inherent limit
consists of a sort of irreconcilability test: “lands subject to aboriginal
title cannot be put to such uses as may be irreconcilable with the nature of the occupation of that land and the relationship that the particular group has had with the land which together have given rise to
aboriginal title in the first place.”92 In the lead opinion in that case,
87. See, e.g., J.J.S. Wharton, Dictionary of Jurisprudence 267–69 (2d ed. 1860).
88. Constitution Act, 1867, pt. VI, § 92A(1)(b) (“development, conservation and management of non-renewable natural resources and forestry resources in the province, including laws in relation to the rate of primary production therefrom”).
89. Id. pt. VI, § 92(5) (“The Management and Sale of the Public Lands belonging to
the Province and of the Timber and Wood thereon.”).
90. See, e.g., Brian Slattery, The Constitutional Dimensions of Aboriginal Title, 71
SUP. CT. L. REV. 45 (2015).
91. Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010, paras. 128–32 (Can.).
92. Id. para. 128.
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Chief Justice Lamer went on to apply this principle to somewhat idiosyncratic examples, suggesting that title established over a traditional
hunting ground would not permit strip mining of the land and that
title based on ceremonial uses of certain land would not permit the
development of parking lots.93 More significantly, in terms of significantly restricting the characteristics of Aboriginal title as a property
right, Chief Justice Lamer also used this inherent limit aspect to explain and thus maintain a long-standing limit on Aboriginal title, that
of its inalienability to anyone other than the government.94
There is an idiosyncratic aspect to the Tsilhqot’in case on this point
as well, though, in that it did not seem to make clear whether it preserves this inherent limit on the scope of Aboriginal title and supplements it, or whether it replaces it. In her judgment, Chief Justice
McLachlin references Delgamuukw and the idea of an “inherent limit”
but does not describe it in precisely the same terms:
As we have seen, Delgamuukw establishes that Aboriginal title “encompasses
the right to exclusive use and occupation of the land held pursuant to that
title for a variety of purposes” (para. 117), including non-traditional purposes,
provided these uses can be reconciled with the communal and ongoing nature
of the group’s attachment to the land. Subject to this inherent limit, the titleholding group has the right to choose the uses to which the land is put and to
enjoy its economic fruits (para. 166).95

Her judgment goes on to describe the restrictions on Aboriginal title in
somewhat different terms altogether, in a manner focused on the preservation of land for future generations.96 That language picks up on a
93. Id. (“For example, if occupation is established with reference to the use of the
land as a hunting ground, then the group that successfully claims aboriginal title
to that land may not use it in such a fashion as to destroy its value for such a use
(e.g., by strip mining it). Similarly, if a group claims a special bond with the land
because of its ceremonial or cultural significance, it may not use the land in such
a way as to destroy that relationship (e.g., by developing it in such a way that the
bond is destroyed, perhaps by turning it into a parking lot).”)
94. Id. para. 129 (“It is for this reason also that lands held by virtue of aboriginal title
may not be alienated. Alienation would bring to an end the entitlement of the
aboriginal people to occupy the land and would terminate their relationship with
it. I have suggested above that the inalienability of aboriginal lands is, at least in
part, a function of the common law principle that settlers in colonies must derive
their title from Crown grant and, therefore, cannot acquire title through
purchase from aboriginal inhabitants. It is also, again only in part, a function of
a general policy ‘to ensure that Indians are not dispossessed of their entitlements’: see Mitchell v. Peguis Indian Band, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 85, at p. 133. What
the inalienability of lands held pursuant to aboriginal title suggests is that those
lands are more than just a fungible commodity. The relationship between an aboriginal community and the lands over which it has aboriginal title has an important non-economic component. The land has an inherent and unique value in
itself, which is enjoyed by the community with aboriginal title to it. The community cannot put the land to uses which would destroy that value.”).
95. Tsilhqot’in Nation v. British Columba, [2014] 2 S.C.R. 256, para. 67 (Can.).
96. Id. para. 74 (“Aboriginal title, however, comes with an important restriction—it
is collective title held not only for the present generation but for all succeeding
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brief reference in para. 166 of Delgamuukw, the paragraph she cited,
which states that “aboriginal title encompasses the right to choose to
what uses land can be put, subject to the ultimate limit that those
uses cannot destroy the ability of the land to sustain future generations of aboriginal peoples.”97 But what was a briefer reference there
has now shifted into a larger description that operates in her judgment without reference to the inherent limit on Aboriginal title as described in Delgamuukw.
The challenging interpretive point here is whether her description
of restrictions on Aboriginal title replaces or supplements the Delgamuukw statement of the inherent limit. The language in the middle
of her reference to Delgamuukw does pick up the Delgamuukw reasoning, as Delgamuukw explained its inherent limit in terms of the ongoing relationship of the group to the land.98 But nowhere does the
Tsilhqot’in judgment, which seems in some respects to be framed as a
relatively complete statement of the Canadian law of Aboriginal title,
actually reference the nature of the inherent limit in the same terms
as Delgamuukw. One could read it as implicitly altering Delgamuukw
on this point, or one could read it as not saying anything on the point
and therefore leaving Delgamuukw undisturbed. Frankly, it is unfortunate that a major Aboriginal title judgment could not be more precise on this point.
There is, effectively, a new inherent limit on Aboriginal title in the
Tsilhqot’in judgment. Here, Chief Justice McLachlin reasons about
the nature of Aboriginal title as being collective title. She writes as
follows:
Aboriginal title, however, comes with an important restriction—it is collective
title held not only for the present generation but for all succeeding generations. This means it cannot be alienated except to the Crown or encumbered
in ways that would prevent future generations of the group from using and
enjoying it. Nor can the land be developed or misused in a way that would
substantially deprive future generations of the benefit of the land. Some
changes—even permanent changes—to the land may be possible. Whether a
particular use is irreconcilable with the ability of succeeding generations to
generations. This means it cannot be alienated except to the Crown or encumbered in ways that would prevent future generations of the group from using and
enjoying it. Nor can the land be developed or misused in a way that would substantially deprive future generations of the benefit of the land. Some changes—
even permanent changes—to the land may be possible. Whether a particular use
is irreconcilable with the ability of succeeding generations to benefit from the
land will be a matter to be determined when the issue arises.”).
97. Delgamuukw, [1997] 3 S.C.R. at para. 166.
98. Id. para. 127 (“The relevance of the continuity of the relationship of an aboriginal
community with its land here is that it applies not only to the past, but to the
future as well. That relationship should not be prevented from continuing into
the future. As a result, uses of the lands that would threaten that future relationship are, by their very nature, excluded from the content of aboriginal title.”).
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benefit from the land will be a matter to be determined when the issue
arises.99

This reasoning offers a specific explanation of the inalienability
dimensions of Aboriginal title, which may be consistent with the view
that this restriction replaces the more broadly stated inherent limit of
Delgamuukw. Whether it does or not, though, it imposes significant—
and complicating—constraints on the nature of the property right that
Aboriginal title represents. In particular, the suggestion that uses of
the land must be measured against the test of non-substantial impact
on future generations having the benefit of the land would arguably
have unpredictable implications. The suggestion that the permissibility of a particular use can be determined “when the issue arises” is not
reassuring. It is not clear who even has standing to assert the claims
of future generations and whether this grounds claims by members of
a community dissenting from a particular development or even
outside groups like environmental non-governmental organizations
(NGOs).100
The citation chains on this restriction get complicated. In the
Tsilhqot’in trial judgment, Justice Vickers wrote that “[s]uch inherent
limits [as articulated in Delgamuukw] prohibit those uses that would
destroy the ability of the land to sustain future generations of Aboriginal peoples: Delgamuukw, para. 128.”101 Such language concerning
future generations does not appear in the cited paragraph of Delgamuukw,102 so the trial judge appears implicitly to have engaged in
an interpretation of the purposes of the inherent limit in Delgamuukw
99. Tsilhqot’in, [2014] 2 S.C.R. at para. 74.
100. COATES & NEWMAN, supra note 16, at 15.
101. Tsilhqot’in Nation v. British Columbia, 2007 BCSC 1700, para. 539 (Can.); cf.
Tsilhqot’in, [2014] 2 S.C.R. 256.
102. Delgamuukw, [1997] 3 S.C.R. at para. 128 (“Accordingly, in my view, lands subject to aboriginal title cannot be put to such uses as may be irreconcilable with
the nature of the occupation of that land and the relationship that the particular
group has had with the land which together have given rise to aboriginal title in
the first place. As discussed below, one of the critical elements in the determination of whether a particular aboriginal group has aboriginal title to certain lands
is the matter of the occupancy of those lands. Occupancy is determined by reference to the activities that have taken place on the land and the uses to which the
land has been put by the particular group. If lands are so occupied, there will
exist a special bond between the group and the land in question such that the
land will be part of the definition of the group’s distinctive culture. It seems to
me that these elements of aboriginal title create an inherent limitation on the
uses to which the land, over which such title exists, may be put. For example, if
occupation is established with reference to the use of the land as a hunting
ground, then the group that successfully claims aboriginal title to that land may
not use it in such a fashion as to destroy its value for such a use (e.g., by strip
mining it). Similarly, if a group claims a special bond with the land because of its
ceremonial or cultural significance, it may not use the land in such a way as to
destroy that relationship (e.g., by developing it in such a way that the bond is
destroyed, perhaps by turning it into a parking lot).”).
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and adopted principles going beyond those articulated in the main discussion of the inherent limit in Delgamuukw. As referenced earlier, a
later paragraph of Delgamuukw, in passing, had made reference to
the possibility of future generations having relevance, with the statement that “[t]he only limitation on this principle [that historic uses
might have changed] might be the internal limits on uses which land
that is subject to aboriginal title may be put, i.e., uses which are inconsistent with continued use by future generations of aboriginals.”103
That statement, in turn, appears to have received no particular explanation or citation in Delgamuukw but simply to have been one isolated
line. So, there is the possibility that a passing reference in Delgamuukw offered the Tsilhqot’in trial judge and, in turn the Supreme
Court of Canada, a means of rearticulating the nature of the inherent
limit on the scope of Aboriginal title. As a result, there is now articulated an element of control over the land in the hands of “future
generations.”
There is arguably a salience between the Supreme Court of Canada’s description and prominent definitions of the notion of “sustainable development,” such as the Brundtland Commission’s statement
that “[s]ustainable development is development that meets the needs
of the present without compromising the ability of future generations
to meet their own needs.”104 To the extent that Aboriginal title lands
are uniquely subject to a restriction on their use that imposes an actual legal rule of sustainable development, the court has arguably
turned them into a unique, experimental form of property regardless
of the potential wishes of Aboriginal communities themselves who
might or might not wish to use their lands in accordance with these
notions of “sustainability.” Thus, these property rights are subjected
to unique limitations.
E.

The Security and Insecurity of Aboriginal Title

Aboriginal title rights are also uniquely both more and less secure
than other property rights in Canada. On the one hand, Aboriginal
title rights receive constitutional protection, unlike other property
rights in Canada. Although many campaigned for constitutional protection for property rights more generally, a variety of historical reasons led to them being excluded from protection in the Charter.105
Though there are ongoing efforts to secure constitutional protection
for property rights generally, and there may be constitutional means
of accomplishing that in part without the full rigours of the general
103. Id. at para 154.
104. Rep. of the World Comm’n on Env’t and Dev., Our Common Future, U.N. Doc. A/
42/27 (1987).
105. See Dwight Newman & Lorelle Binnion, The Exclusion of Property Rights from
the Charter: Correcting the Historical Record, 52 ALTA. L. REV. 543 (2015).
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amending formula,106 those efforts have not been successful to this
point in time. Thus, Aboriginal property rights, unlike other property
rights, are uniquely subject to constitutional protection in Canada,
and since the 1982 constitutional amendments, such rights are no
longer subject to legislative “extinguishment.”107
At a constitutional level, this also means that Aboriginal property
rights are uniquely subject to judicial development and no longer subject to simple legislative change.108 Perhaps partly in response to the
challenging institutional features of this dynamic, the courts have developed ways in which Aboriginal property rights are actually
uniquely insecure relative to other property rights in so far as they are
subject explicitly to the constitutionalized possibility of infringement
or override.109
Although less prominent in some of the early discussions of the
case, the Tsilhqot’in judgment actually discussed the justified-infringement or override test at some length.110 The first statement of
the requirements actually appears relatively minimalist:
To justify overriding the Aboriginal title-holding group’s wishes on the basis of
the broader public good, the government must show: (1) that it discharged its
procedural duty to consult and accommodate; (2) that its actions were backed
by a compelling and substantial objective; and (3) that the governmental ac106. See Dwight Newman, The Bilateral Amending Formula as a Mechanism for the
Entrenchment of Property Rights, 21 CONST. F. 17 (2013).
107. See R. v. Van der Peet, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507, para. 28 (Can.) (“Subsequent to s.
35(1) aboriginal rights cannot be extinguished and can only be regulated or infringed consistent with the justificatory test laid out by this Court in Sparrow,
supra.”); Marshall and Bernard, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 220, para. 39 (Can.) (stating similarly that “[p]rior to constitutionalization of aboriginal rights in 1982, aboriginal
title could be extinguished by clear legislative act (see Van der Peet, at para. 125).
Now that is not possible. The Crown can impinge on aboriginal title only if it can
establish that this is justified in pursuance of a compelling and substantial legislative objective for the good of larger society: R. v. Sparrow, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075,
at p. 1113. This process can be seen as a way of reconciling aboriginal interests
with the interests of the broader community.”); see also Jeremy Webber & Kirsty
Gover, Proprietary Constitutionalism, in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 361 (Mark Tushnet et al. eds., 2013) (discussing different constitutional protections of different types of property in different states).
108. But see Newman, Aboriginal Rights, Collective Rights, supra note 74 (discussing
the possible use of the bilateral amending formula to alter Aboriginal or treaty
rights within a province without the use of the full amending formula).
109. See generally, Dwight Newman, The Limitation of Rights: A Comparative Evolution and Ideology of the Oakes and Sparrow Tests, 62 SASK. L. REV. 543 [hereinafter Newman, The Limitation of Rights] (examining judicial development of limits
on Indigenous rights without textual basis for such limits).
110. Tsilhqot’in Nation v. British Columba, [2014] 2 S.C.R. 256, paras. 77–88, 119–27
(Can.) (discussing override of Aboriginal title generally) (discussing infringement
in context of provincial regulation or legislation affecting Aboriginal title lands,
with some reference back to the test from the earlier discussion and some further
discussion).
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tion is consistent with the Crown’s fiduciary obligation to the group:
Sparrow.111

The first two requirements simply reflect the broader duty-to-consult
doctrine as well as a requirement of a compelling reason for the override, but neither is especially difficult. The fiduciary obligation requirement is where justification will be principally at issue, based on
its two requirements. One is a standard proportionality analysis,112
similar to that for limitation of other constitutional rights.113 There
may be challenging aspects in meeting this test in terms of showing
minimal infringement of the title right relative to other ways of
achieving the same compelling objective, but those will be factcontingent.
More puzzling is the further requirement the court states as part of
the fiduciary obligation branch, which is that
the Crown’s fiduciary duty means that the government must act in a way that
respects the fact that Aboriginal title is a group interest that inheres in present and future generations. The beneficial interest in the land held by the
Aboriginal group vests communally in the title-holding group. This means
that incursions on Aboriginal title cannot be justified if they would substantially deprive future generations of the benefit of the land.114

The phrasing that is essentially ad idem with a restriction on the community’s ownership of the land introduces a complex dynamic. Aboriginal title lands seem to be rendered uniquely incapable of certain
types of development since it cannot be pursued either by the community voluntarily or by the government through use of its override powers. At the same time, those within a community who want full use of
their lands and governments and who do not want greater limits on
their override powers are now rendered into allied positions since both
will presumably urge narrow interpretations of this wording. However, if Aboriginal communities push for legal interpretations that
give them less restricted forms of land ownership, they end up with
less secure forms of land ownership since government override powers
then seem to be readily applicable pursuant to some procedural requirements and a standard proportionality analysis.

111. Id. para. 77.
112. Id. para. 87.
113. Id. (using the terms of the Oakes test on proportionality in the Charter context
and thus making the analogy clear); see also Newman, The Limitation of Rights,
supra note 109 (older article articulating this parallelism); Dwight Newman, Canadian Proportionality Analysis: 5 1/2 Myths, 73 SUP. CT. L. REV. 93 (2016) (discussing application of proportionality test here not based on constitutional text,
but on judicial analogies to the Charter context).
114. Tsilhqot’in, [2014] 2 S.C.R. at para. 86.
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The Implications of Unsettled Aboriginal Title Claims

One important further dimension relates to the presence of numerous ongoing Aboriginal title claims in jurisdictions like British Columbia that will not be quickly settled or litigated. The Tsilhqot’in
decision effectively makes more of these claims viable, or even strong.
In particular, it says that the type of land use engaged in by historically mobile Aboriginal communities can support successful title
claims and that the tracts at issue are likely to be more continuous
territories rather than sites of specific, intensive use. As a result, it
effectively strengthens various title claims.
Canada’s modern duty-to-consult doctrine, developed since a trilogy of Supreme Court of Canada cases in 2004–2005,115 is essentially
a requirement that governments contemplating administrative decisions that may have an adverse impact on an Aboriginal or treaty
right, even in the face of uncertainty on the scope of that right, have a
duty to consult the potentially impacted Aboriginal community and
potentially accommodate their interests.116 The depth of that consultation—or the extent of what governments are expected to do under
the doctrine—varies based on the two factors of the degree of adverse
impact and the prima facie strength of the claim.117 As a result, to the
extent that Tsilhqot’in strengthens Aboriginal title claims, one of its
immediate impacts in the context of outstanding Aboriginal title cases
is to expand the scope of consultation obligations applicable in various
contexts.
The duty to consult, in principle, is a duty owed by governments to
Aboriginal communities.118 At a practical level, a common implication of the duty to consult for Aboriginal communities has been to reward the presence of uncertainty and even perhaps to incentivize the
creation of uncertainty, with uncertainty of the results of consultation
processes or their timing giving reason for third-party resource development proponents to enter into agreements directly with Aboriginal
communities.119 Agreements such as Impact Benefit Agreements
(IBAs) will include a “support clause” under which an Aboriginal community agrees to support a project in the context of consultation discussions in return for various benefits, which may include direct
115. See Mikisew Cree First Nation v. Canada (Minister of Canadian Heritage), [2005]
3 S.C.R. 388 (Can.); Haida Nation v. British Columbia (Minister of Forests),
[2004] 3 S.C.R. 511 (Can.); Taku River Tlingit First Nation v. British Columbia
(Project Assessment Director), [2004] 3 S.C.R. 550 (Can.).
116. See generally NEWMAN, THE DUTY TO CONSULT, supra note 21; NEWMAN, REVISITING THE DUTY TO CONSULT, supra note 21.
117. Haida, [2004] 3 S.C.R. at paras. 43–44.
118. Id. paras. 52–56 (rejecting any suggestion of a duty to consult owed by third parties, though permitting the government to delegate elements of the duty to consult to industry).
119. See NEWMAN, REVISITING THE DUTY TO CONSULT, supra note 21, at 82–84.
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financial compensation, but may also include economy-building provisions like contracting provisions, training provisions, or employment
provisions.120
Such agreements may also include environmental-governance provisions, with these negotiated directly between Aboriginal communities and resource-development companies, thus securing
environmental governance in a privatized form, albeit potentially subject to not including all interests that may be affected by that environmental governance. There is, nonetheless, an interesting Coasean
dimension here that would itself warrant further study insofar as the
context provides precisely for transactions related to the protection of
environmental considerations.
In some of its language about the implications of unresolved Aboriginal title claims, the Tsilhqot’in judgment tends to weigh supportively for these sorts of agreements, albeit with language that also
generates some concerns. Two paragraphs in particular offer comment on the concept of consent in the context of uncertain Aboriginal
title claims.121 These are, of course, to be distinguished from consent
in the context of an established title claim, where the usual rule applies that there cannot be development on an owner’s land without
that owner’s consent, subject to the override possibilities outlined
earlier.122
Here, though, in the face of calls by some interveners to the litigation to move strongly toward their interpretation of the international
standard on consent embodied in the United Nations Declaration on
Indigenous Rights,123 the court carefully avoided citing the Declaration, but some see its language on consent as having been influenced
by it.124 The court suggested, first of all, that agreement with an Ab120. Id.; see also NEWMAN, NATURAL RESOURCE JURISDICTION, supra note 24 (discussing support clauses in IBAs).
121. Tsilhqot’in Nation v. British Columba, [2014] 2 S.C.R. 256, paras. 92, 97 (Can.).
122. Id. para. 76 (“The right to control the land conferred by Aboriginal title means
that governments and others seeking to use the land must obtain the consent of
the Aboriginal title holders. If the Aboriginal group does not consent to the use,
the government’s only recourse is to establish that the proposed incursion on the
land is justified under s. 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982.”).
123. G.A. Res. 61/295, Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (Sept. 7, 2007);
see also NEWMAN, REVISITING THE DUTY TO CONSULT, supra note 21, at 142–53
(discussing legal status of the Declaration and its provisions related to consent).
See generally S. J. ROMBOUTS, HAVING A SAY: INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND FREE, PRIOR AND INFORMED CONSENT (2014); CATHAL M. DOYLE,
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, TITLE TO TERRITORY, RIGHTS AND RESOURCES: THE TRANSFORMATIVE ROLE OF FREE PRIOR AND INFORMED CONSENT (2015) (discussing developing concepts on free, prior, and informed consent).
124. See, e.g., Special Legal Update: Tsilhqot’in Nation v. British Columbia: Considering the Implications, MILLER TITERLE, June 30, 2014, at 6 (stating that “[i]n
Tsilhqot’in, while the Court stopped short of requiring FPIC for project development on Aboriginal title lands, it paved the way for FPIC to become a practical
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original community is sufficient to avoid later difficulties concerning
justified infringement or the duty to consult: “I add this. Governments and individuals proposing to use or exploit land, whether before
or after a declaration of Aboriginal title, can avoid a charge of infringement or failure to adequately consult by obtaining the consent of the
interested Aboriginal group.”125
Second, the court suggested that there could be serious consequences to not obtaining consent:
Once title is established, it may be necessary for the Crown to reassess prior
conduct in light of the new reality in order to faithfully discharge its fiduciary
duty to the title-holding group going forward. For example, if the Crown begins a project without consent prior to Aboriginal title being established, it
may be required to cancel the project upon establishment of the title if continuation of the project would be unjustifiably infringing.126

This statement contains a potentially frightening dimension that expands legal uncertainty in so far as it bandies the prospect that the
remedy for a mistaken infringement might be cancellation of a project.
If one wanted language to discourage multi-billion dollar investments,
language speaking of retroactive cancellation of the projects would be
good language to employ.
In the context of unsettled Aboriginal title claims, some of this language of the court appears to have tendencies to expand uncertainty
rather than to assist with its management. That said, it certainly incentivizes resource-development companies to enter into consensual
agreements with Aboriginal communities, although with the standards for that agreement potentially uncertain in the context of claims
by future generations. At the same time, it may perpetuate incentives
for Aboriginal communities to expand uncertainty so as to foster better incentives for agreements, a consequence that does not seem
closely geared to the purposes of encouraging negotiation and
reconciliation.
III. THE PROPERTY RIGHTS CHARACTERISTICS
OF ABORIGINAL TITLE
A.

Theoretical Characteristics of Title

As Part II has already begun to highlight,127 there are some characteristics of Aboriginal title as a property right that differ from those
associated with models of an economically ideal form of property
rights. In particular, there are unusual characteristics to Aboriginal
title insofar as it exhibits uncertainties of scope and incentivization of
norm in Canada”); cf. COATES & NEWMAN, supra note 16, at 17–18 (expressing
nuanced view on these points).
125. Tsilhqot’in, [2014] 2 S.C.R. at para. 97.
126. Id. para. 92.
127. See supra Part II.
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attempts to create further uncertainty, simultaneous imposition of
roles to multiple decision makers on uses of the property and of surprisingly fragmented ownership characteristics, and significant restrictions on alienability of property rights. As will become apparent,
these characteristics risk significant, negative economic consequences
both in the context of contracting with outsiders, such as with resource-development proponents, and in the context of members’ own
use of the land.
First, there are various uncertainties associated with the scope of
Aboriginal title and there are, in fact, some incentives to perpetuate
these uncertainties. These uncertainties—some of them probably not
entirely avoidable in the developmental phase of a new doctrine—are
present in the test for the establishment of Aboriginal title,128 in the
doctrine on both the contents of Aboriginal title and the inherent limits on Aboriginal title,129 and even in the doctrine on the possibility of
overrides of Aboriginal title.130 Many property rights are subject to
some legal uncertainties or some degree of insecurity,131 but the present state of Aboriginal title doctrine seems to make uncertainty an
all-pervasive characteristic.
Some might try to see the court as exercising prudent restraint in
not settling all matters on the scope of Indigenous property rights and
suggest that it has tried to strike a balance in providing what certainty it can while avoiding making determinations with longer term
consequences. However, its record is less positive than that in many
respects. The court has, rather, lurched between seemingly more settled positions. In Marshall and Bernard, it made some statements
that seemed to weigh against Aboriginal title for historically mobile
communities, even as the separate opinion of Justice LeBel warned of
this very issue.132 Now, it has moved back toward a position that his128.
129.
130.
131.

See supra section II.B.
See supra section II.C.
See supra section II.D.
See, e.g., Maurice Schiff, Uncertain Property Rights and the Coase Theorem, 7
RATIONALITY & SOC’Y 321, 326–27 (1995) (suggesting that many property rights
are not entirely certain a priori, but that Pareto gains are then possible through
their clarification).
132. Marshall and Bernard, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 220, para. 126 (Can.) (LeBel, J., concurring) (“Although the test for aboriginal title set out in the Chief Justice’s reasons
does not foreclose the possibility that semi-nomadic peoples would be able to establish aboriginal title, it may prove to be fundamentally incompatible with a
nomadic or semi-nomadic lifestyle. This test might well amount to a denial that
any aboriginal title could have been created by such patterns of nomadic or seminomadic occupation or use: nomadic life might have given rise to specific rights
exercised at specific places or within identifiable territories, but never to a connection with the land itself in the absence of evidence of intensive and regular use
of the land.”); see also Newman, Aboriginal Rights, Collective Rights, supra note
74 (discussing various elements of Justice LeBel’s foresight in the Aboriginal law
context).
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torically mobile communities can meet the standards for sufficient, exclusive prior occupation and thus meet the title test.133 In a past
treaty-rights case, the court had seemed to imply reasonably clearly
that provinces (as opposed to the federal government) could not justifiably infringe on treaty rights due to division-of-powers considerations.134 However, weeks after the Tsilhqot’in judgment, the court
relied upon it as if it were a long-established precedent that weighed
in the other direction on the point without ever engaging with the contrary precedent.135 The very possibility that the law continues to be
in constant motion actually introduces a further uncertainty on the
scope of property rights in this context.
Moreover, whereas most property rights owners would typically be
incentivized to try to clear up uncertainties with respect to the scope
of their property rights, there are complex counterincentives present
with Aboriginal title. Because of the duty-to-consult doctrine and the
fact that it essentially creates significant benefits associated with uncertainty,136 Aboriginal title with uncertain scope can actually be relatively beneficial in at least some circumstances for some
communities.137 Thus, there are significant short-term incentives to
maintain uncertainties.
Ultimately, as with property rights generally, uncertainties on the
scope of property rights increase transaction costs, elevate risk premiums, undermine the possibility of transactions associated with those
property rights, or all of the above.138 In the case of Aboriginal title,
communities themselves may be uncertain on what they can do with
their own land, with such uncertainties disincentivizing economically
optimal uses of their land that they would choose. Additionally, outsiders attempting to transact with Aboriginal communities are potentially uncertain on the scope of rights that communities can convey in
certain respects. These features create an economically problematic
characteristic on the Aboriginal title property right.
133. See Tsilhqot’in Nation v. British Columba, [2014] 2 S.C.R. 256 (Can.).
134. R. v. Morris, [2006] 2 S.C.R. 915 (Can.).
135. Grassy Narrows First Nation v. Ontario (Natural Resources), [2014] 2 S.C.R. 447,
para. 53 (Can.) (“The doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity does not preclude
the Province from justifiably infringing treaty rights (Tsilhqot’in Nation v. British Columbia, 2014 SCC 44, [2014] 2 S.C.R. 256). While it is unnecessary to consider this issue, this Court’s decision in Tsilhqot’in Nation is a full answer.”).
136. NEWMAN, REVISITING THE DUTY TO CONSULT, supra note 21, at 82–84, 171–72.
137. Id.; see also Dwight Newman, The Rule and Role of Law: The Duty to Consult,
Aboriginal Communities, and the Canadian Natural Resource Sector, MACDONALD-LAURIER INST. ABORIGINAL CAN. & NAT. RESOURCES ECON. SERIES, May 2014,
at 12 [hereinafter Newman, The Rule and Role of Law] (discussing how uncertainty turns the duty to consult into an effective lever with industry).
138. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 4, 621 (9th ed. 2014)
(discussing some consequences of uncertain property rights).
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Second, perhaps counterintuitively relative to the main assumptions one might make about a collective property right, there are significant anticommons issues with respect to Aboriginal title.139 In the
context even of established Aboriginal title, collective ownership on
behalf of both present and future generations complicates decision
making about the property, especially in the context of complex challenges on governance structures. The Tsilhqot’in Nation itself needs
to function as an amalgam of six legal First Nations or “bands” that
are legally structured entities. More generally, it is not clear whether
present elected leadership of a community can legitimately make decisions concerning uses of the land or whether these decisions are subject to challenges from hereditary leadership and those supporting
hereditary leadership structures, dissenting members whose position
is reinforced by their being imprecisely defined limits on the use of the
land, or others who purport to represent the interests of future generations, potentially including outside environmental NGOs. Challenging interactions with NGOs arise in the case of communities that are
actually enthusiastic about development rather than fitting NGOs’
models of the “ecological Indian.”140
Moreover, the insecurity of title associated with specific governmental override powers, albeit not totally distinct from the possibility
of expropriation or eminent domain with other lands, introduces another possible decision-maker with respect to the lands, particularly
because there may seem to be overlapping Aboriginal and provincial
rights to “manage” the lands. What is framed as an inherently collective title, in the way in which it has been developed by the court’s
reasoning, may actually display characteristics more commonly associated with fragmented ownership. Fragmented ownership gives rise
to anticommons problems where transaction costs make it impossible
to unify the necessary property rights to carry out a particular project
even though some project along those lines would be desirable from
the standpoint of at least many of the various owners,141 and that fate
may await Aboriginal title lands in some instances. Multiplicity of de-

139. See generally James M. Buchanan & Yong J. Yoon, Symmetric Tragedies: Commons and Anticommons, 43 J.L. & ECON. 1 (2000) (discussing how fragmentation
of ownership gives rise to an anticommons problem); Heller, The Tragedy of the
Anticommons, supra note 7 (discussing anticommons issues with fractionated
ownership of American Indian lands).
140. See COATES & NEWMAN, supra note 16, at 15 (discussing some of these challenges). See generally, SHEPARD KRECH III, THE ECOLOGICAL INDIAN: MYTH AND
HISTORY (1999) (controversial book on degree of environmental sensitivity in
traditional Indigenous practices).
141. Buchanan & Yoon, supra note 139.
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cision makers and jurisdictional uncertainties in regards to property
control all give rise to the same sort of anticommons problem.142
Third, what the court deems to be the inherently collective aspect
of Aboriginal title could also pose more traditional commons problems
or other problems associated with an absence of private property
rights. It is unclear whether the decision would permit a community
holding Aboriginal title to establish private property rights held by
individual members.143 That lack of clarity stems significantly from
uncertainty on whether such internal alienation would be considered
to deny the benefit of the land to future generations of the group.
There could be some arguments each way on the present phrasing of
the judgment, but there is at least a meaningful possibility that the
judgment precludes alienation to individuals within the group, which
may preclude the most effective form of landholding in respect of certain possible uses of the land.
It is clear that the judgment uses the inherently collective aspect of
Aboriginal title to maintain restrictions on alienation to outsiders,
other than through surrender of land to the government. This sort of
restriction on alienation has been a long-standing restriction on Indigenous communities in various states. It has sometimes been portrayed as a protection of Indigenous communities from swindling
settlers,144 and to that extent it would amount to a policy embodying
some degree of light paternalism, potentially serving some regulatory
functions. However, there is expanding scholarly work that suggests
that the policy also served as one that empowered governments as monopolistic purchasers and thus maintained lower land prices for Indigenous lands that were surrendered.145
If one were searching for a plausible and more acceptable justification for the restriction on alienation, a significant emerging scholar,
Malcolm Lavoie, has offered a potentially promising explanation that
the policy addresses certain public choice problems present if leadership are empowered to alienate land too readily.146 However, he finds
even these explanations to break down relative to the economic benefits that might be available to communities from limited alienations of
land, subject to some important protections for the cultural interests
at stake that may require meaningful ongoing landholding.147 In any
142. See generally Michael A. Heller, The Boundaries of Private Property, 108 YALE
L.J. 1163, 1187–88 (1999) (describing jurisdictional uncertainty as giving rise to
anti-commons issues).
143. Tom Flanagan & Ravina Bains, Aboriginal Title’s True Meaning: Billable Hours,
GLOBE & MAIL (July 16, 2015); COATES & NEWMAN, supra note 16.
144. See, e.g., Malcolm Lavoie, Why Restrain Alienation of Indigenous Lands?, 49 U.
B.C. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016) (referencing this traditional explanation).
145. Id.; Kades, supra note 4.
146. Lavoie, supra note 144.
147. Id.
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event, as has famously been the case with Indigenous property, the
Supreme Court of Canada maintains restrictions on alienation that,
as with any such restrictions, may preclude transactions that are economically beneficial to all participants.
In several different respects then, the form of property right embodied in Aboriginal title after the Tsilhqot’in judgment contains characteristics that economic theory strongly suggests will give rise to
certain dysfunctionalities and thus undermine the potential prosperity of Indigenous communities. Even when succeeding in their land
claims, Indigenous communities are not receiving the kind of property
right that could be most beneficial to them.
Some Canadian Aboriginal communities may have recognized this
point already and have arguably been clear that they would prefer
forms of landholding other than Aboriginal title that is subject still to
potentially unknown restrictions and unstable judicial interpretations. For example, in Delgamuukw, the Gitxsan and Wet’suwet’en
communities actually litigated in the first instance to try to claim fee
simple ownership, with Aboriginal title as an alternative.148 In modern treaties negotiated in the shadow of the Aboriginal title jurisprudence, there is no treaty that entrenches Aboriginal title over land,
with those negotiating the treaties preferring instead to replace Aboriginal title with more certain property rights concepts, including fee
simple landholdings, resource royalty rights over further territory,
and so on.149 Indeed, in a negotiation subsequent to the Tsilhqot’in
decision, the accord between British Columbia and the Tsilhqot’in Nation pertains to the transfer of further land in fee simple rather than
in Aboriginal title, no doubt offering much greater legal clarity on this
further land claim.150 A possible reading is that the ongoing jurisprudential development of Aboriginal title as a unique property right continues to develop a property right that has economically dysfunctional
characteristics, and that Aboriginal communities are avoiding as their
form of landholding when they can, other than when they consider
litigation for their property to be their only viable option.
B.

The Real Costs of Uncertain Economic Characteristics
of Aboriginal Title: Examples of Practical
Consequences for Mining Development

The ways in which these economic characteristics of Aboriginal title could play out problematically for an Aboriginal community are ap148. See Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010, para. 110 (Can.) (discussing plaintiffs’ claim to an inalienable fee simple as their land right).
149. See generally ISAAC, supra note 34, at 161–86 (outlining key contents of modern
treaties).
150. Nenqay Deni Accord: The People’s Accord, British Columbia-Tsilhqot’in Nation,
Feb. 11, 2016.
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parent if one considers a hypothetical community with potential
Aboriginal title claims to traditional territories that contain mineral
resources. Such a community is not especially hypothetical, but arguably representative of many communities in British Columbia.151
There are several ways in which the judicial choices that have been
made that bear on the economic characteristics of Aboriginal title
make the community’s Aboriginal title claim less beneficial to the
community than could have been the case.
The courts have not directly ruled on whether Aboriginal title encompasses subsurface mineral rights, and there are strong arguments
that that question actually remains unresolved.152 So, even in the
event of a determination that a community holds Aboriginal title,
there is an immediate uncertainty in the scope of a pertinent property
right. Importantly, it is not even immediately clear whether an Aboriginal community that holds Aboriginal title, and thus surface
rights to the land, would be permitted to allow mineral development
activities on that land. The “inherent limit” on Aboriginal title has
been explicitly held to preclude strip mining,153 and whether other
mining development is consistent with the constraint on the use of
Aboriginal title land to maintain its value for future generations is not
clear. An Aboriginal community that is favorable to mining development may or may not be legally authorized to undertake it, and any
arrangements with it on mining development are thus subject to uncertainty and, at a minimum, enhance transaction costs in light of this
uncertainty. Clearer rulings on the scope of Aboriginal title rights
could have avoided this diminishment of its value to the community.
Beyond the uncertainty related to the scope of title, there will be
further challenges that come from the presence of multiple decision
makers in respect of any uses of the Aboriginal title lands that would
be potentially legally permissible. The possibility of a legal challenge
to a present decision based on a future generation’s stake in the Aboriginal title land leads to some fracturing of decision-making authority, as it will become safer to proceed with a particular development
only with clearer broader-based support to minimize the possibility of
legal challenges. This spreading of authority may be in the very com151. See ISAAC, supra note 34, at 162.
152. See Robin M. Junger, Aboriginal Title and Mining in Canada: More Questions
than Answers, PROC. 61ST ANN. ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. (2015).
153. Delgamuukw, [1997] 3 S.C.R. at para. 128 (“For example, if occupation is established with reference to the use of the land as a hunting ground, then the group
that successfully claims aboriginal title to that land may not use it in such a
fashion as to destroy its value for such a use (e.g., by strip mining it). Similarly, if
a group claims a special bond with the land because of its ceremonial or cultural
significance, it may not use the land in such a way as to destroy that relationship
(e.g., by developing it in such a way that the bond is destroyed, perhaps by turning it into a parking lot).”).
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mon context of a community with a division between legally recognized governing authorities under Canada’s Indian Act154 (Canada’s
principal statutory regime for First Nations, much hated for its paternalistic elements, but not being subject to any simple abolition without the development of some substitute identification of legally
necessary structures for First Nations to function as legal entities in
Canada) and the hereditary leadership within the community. Which
representatives speak on behalf of the rights-bearing community may
be a complex matter, and judicial choices that have tended to fracture
decision-making authority concerning Aboriginal title lands have further diminished communities’ abilities to use their land in the productive ways that they might choose.
A further complication to decision-making authority comes from
the possibility that the pertinent rights-bearing community for the
purposes of the Aboriginal title claim does not correspond to current
legal entities but to differently constituted historic entities, as was the
case in the Tsilhqot’in decision itself.155 Although the judicial reasoning is an attempt to respond to who validly has a property claim, it
nonetheless gives rise to further problems of fractionated decisionmaking authority. The same may be said of the matter of overlapping
Aboriginal title claims, a widespread phenomenon in British Columbia, where Aboriginal title claims add up to more than the entire land
mass of the province.156 If a community has established Aboriginal
title, that issue may perhaps be presumed away, but the reality before
title is established is that there are in fact a further array of potential
claims to decision making concerning the potential Aboriginal-title
territory.
In many property rights contexts, there would be strong incentives
on parties to seek to resolve issues concerning these sorts of uncertainties.157 In the context of a potential mining development, communities that could benefit from the development would have incentives on
them to resolve issues within and between them so as to enable an
economically productive development to proceed and for it to be reasonably possible to identify situations in which other economically
productive developments could proceed. However, the judicially developed doctrine of consultation generates various, more complex incentives here. Uncertainties on Aboriginal rights, including
Aboriginal title, can be used to extract agreements under the duty-to154. Indian Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-5 (Can.).
155. See Tsilhqot’in Nation v. British Columba, [2014] 2 S.C.R. 256 (Can.).
156. See generally BC TREATY COMMISSION, ANNUAL REPORT RECOMMENDATION 8
(2014) (discussing various issues associated with overlapping claims).
157. See generally Stewart E. Sterk, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Uncertainty
About Property Rights, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1285 (2008) (discussing social and private incentives related to resolving uncertainties on property rights generally).
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consult doctrine even in areas where an Aboriginal title claim would
not legally succeed.158 The duty to consult arises based on asserted
rights, and the legal challenges it can create often give resource project proponents sufficient incentive simply to enter into a variety of
side deals with communities.159 In the case of a potential mining development, these might be with each of several communities asserting
overlapping title claims and, perhaps, even with others with claims to
other Aboriginal rights claimed to be potentially affected by development in an area to which those rights claimants recognize that they do
not have title. Although, in principle, the duty to consult applies to
governments and not to industry,160 governments have tried to delegate it to industry, even sometimes in informal ways by effectively
shirking governmental responsibilities and leaving industry to sort
matters out via agreement.161
A reader who identifies a challenging situation for mining development reads the situation correctly. This uncertainty undermines the
prospects for mining development. In the context of Aboriginal communities with limited economic opportunities, there might have been
Pareto-preferable outcomes that have been blocked by transaction
costs and uncertainties that the parameters of court decisions have
ended up generating.
The judicial recognition of the possibility of Aboriginal title, of
course, makes Aboriginal communities better off than they would
have been without it, as does the possibility of claims by communities
under the duty-to-consult doctrine. Indeed, there might be more general reasons to prefer this form of private property ownership over
ongoing ownership of the resource by the provincial government—socalled “Crown ownership”—which is the usual situation on lands and
resources through much of British Columbia.162 But the point is that
particular parameters of the decisions may have undermined the
value to Aboriginal communities of the property right courts were recognizing. Because courts, including the Supreme Court of Canada in
Tsilhqot’in,163 approach Indigenous title rights in terms of public law
158. Cf. NEWMAN, REVISITING THE DUTY TO CONSULT, supra note 21, at 82–83; Newman, The Rule and Role of Law, supra note 137.
159. Cf. NEWMAN, REVISITING THE DUTY TO CONSULT, supra note 21, at 82–83; Newman, The Rule and Role of Law, supra note 137.
160. Haida Nation v. British Columbia (Minister of Forests), [2004] 3 S.C.R. 511, para.
53 (Can.).
161. See, e.g., Wahgoshig First Nation v. Ontario (2012), 120 O.R. 3d 782 (Can. Ont.
Sup. Ct. J.) (granting leave to appeal from injunction issued in favor of First Nation against industry stakeholder where no formal delegation of consultation obligations from provincial government and government just hoping negotiations
would sort out issues).
162. See generally NEWMAN, NATURAL RESOURCE JURISDICTION, supra note 24 (discussing prevalent provincial ownership of lands, particularly in the West).
163. Tsilhqot’in Nation v. British Columba, [2014] 2 S.C.R. 256 (Can.).
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analyses based on reasoning about abstract values of “reconciliation”
and mysterious ideas of sui generis rights, they are not necessarily
attuned to the practical, private law outcomes of their constitutional
theory deliberations. In the process, they seem to have made choices
that undermine the property rights of Indigenous communities.
IV. WHY COMMON LAW JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENT MAY NOT
WORK WITH ABORIGINAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
The idea that the common law develops in a manner consistent
with economic efficiency is found particularly as a central claim in the
seminal law and economics scholarship of Richard Posner,164 although scholars working in his wake have arguably significantly advanced his argument and even led him to alter his own articulation of
it.165 Law and economics scholarship has gradually moved toward
showing the efficiency of particular common law rules, broadly sustaining at an empirical level the claim that the common law has developed in economically efficient forms.166 However, some have gone
further in trying to explain an underlying mechanism for why the
common law has developed in this manner,167 moving beyond what
early Posnerian writings seemed at times to regard as something simply emerging from the attitudes of judges168 toward something
grounded in the nature of the common law system and the incentives
164. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 138 (discussing this claim and explaining it in terms
of judges considering economic efficiency of their results). This claim appeared
differently at different stages of Posner’s career. See also GUIDO CALABRESI, THE
FUTURE OF LAW AND ECONOMICS: ESSAYS IN REFORM AND RECOLLECTION 14–18
(2016) (discussing Posner’s approach to economic analysis of law).
165. Cf. Posner, supra note 138 (showing generally different approach to explanation
of how judges arrive at economically efficient results).
166. See, e.g., Anthony Niblett et al., The Evolution of a Legal Rule, 39 J. LEGAL STUD.
325 (2010) (discussing empirical findings across different areas of commercial
law, with some mixed results).
167. See, e.g., Paul H. Rubin, Why is the Common Law Efficient?, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 51
(1977) (starting to grapple with the development of a theory on a mechanism for
why the common law would develop in this way, suggesting that currently inefficient rules are more likely to be taken to court and thus replaced); George L.
Priest, The Common Law Process and the Selection of Efficient Rules, 6 J. LEGAL
STUD. 65 (1977) (similarly beginning engagement with the question). Cf. Nuno
Garoupa & Carlos Gómez Ligüerre, The Syndrome of the Efficiency of the Common Law, 29 B.U. INT’L L.J. 287, 294 (2011) (arguing that such a mechanism is
needed to give credibility to the original Posnerian hypothesis).
168. See Richard A. Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory, 8 J. LEGAL
STUD. 103 (1979); cf. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW (Mark
DeWolfe Howe ed., 1963) (arguing that common law judges reflect on public policy issues and respond to public policy concerns out of being representatives of
the community, although not arguing on economic efficiency per se); Barry Friedman, The Politics of Judicial Review, 84 TEX. L. REV. 257 (2005) (arguing within
positive political theory that judicial ideology does have some impact).
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it maintains around litigation.169 More recently, scholars have also
rightly identified limitations on these mechanisms and possible ways
in which deficiencies in versions of the common law system could undermine its attainment of economic efficiency.170 Aside from any outright claim of perfect economic efficiency in the common law, in the
real world of choices that each have opportunity costs and in which
public-choice dynamics may have significant implications, there are
also important scholarly approaches that more simply identify the
common law’s relative efficiency as compared to the alternative of
statutory law, with the latter especially often subject to various sorts
of public choice-based distortions that undermine its regulatory
choices.171
Given this variety of scholarship, it is not a straightforward matter
to put a claim as to why a particular area of property rights jurisprudence would depart from the main dynamics of common law efficiency,
because, although there is significant agreement on the efficiency of
the common law, there is some mix of differentiation between the
mechanisms by which that efficiency is said to be obtained. A full case
for an exception would require argument in terms of all of the different accounts. So, the present argument is aimed simply at making an
exception plausible.
Accounts of the efficiency of the common law suggesting that efficiency derives from deliberate judicial efforts to devise economically
beneficial rules have always been questioned on the basis that one seldom finds judges making any explicit reference to such considerations.
However, the area of Aboriginal title jurisprudence sees judges actively describing specifically different aims in their development of the
169. See, e.g., John C. Goodman, An Economic Theory of the Evolution of Common
Law, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 393 (1978) (emphasizing assessment of likelihoods of litigation victory); Robert Cooter & Lewis Kornhauser, Can Litigation Improve the
Law Without the Help of Judges?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 139 (1980) (arguing evolutionary approach); Paul H. Rubin, Micro and Macro Legal Efficiency: Supply and Demand, 13 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 19, 20–27 (2005) (discussing the application of
evolutionary models to the common law); Todd J. Zywicki, The Rise and Fall of
Efficiency in the Common Law: A Supply-Side Analysis, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1551
(2003) (exploring various implications of supply-side theory); FRANCESCO PARISI
& VINCY FON, THE ECONOMICS OF LAWMAKING (2009).
170. See, e.g., Daniel Klerman, Jurisdictional Competition and the Evolution of the
Common Law, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1179 (2007) (showing how some past features of
judicial compensation led to a pro-plaintiff inclination in parts of the law); Gillian
K. Hadfield, Bias in the Evolution of Legal Rules, 80 Geo. L.J. 583 (1992) (showing potential problems with unrepresentative subset of cases being litigated);
Mark J. Roe, Chaos and Evolution in Law and Economics, 109 HARV. L. REV. 641
(raising a variety of issues related to path dependence as complicating factors on
possibility of law developing efficiently).
171. See, e.g., THE COMMON LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT: RETHINKING THE STATUTORY
BASIS FOR MODERN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (Roger E. Meiners & Andrew P. Morris
eds., 2000).
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jurisprudence. Indeed, on Aboriginal title, the overall trajectory of the
concept’s development has overwhelmingly supposed that the courts
would develop Aboriginal title as a sui generis concept rather than
seeking to identify if prior Aboriginal possession could reasonably
ground a right to an established, certain, and efficient form of property right. Judges analyzing rights in this context have done so in
terms of more public law concepts, or concepts like the sui generis nature of Aboriginal rights, rather than in terms of the necessary private
law characteristics of Aboriginal property rights.
The discussion above of the potential jurisdictional dimension of
Aboriginal title potentially illustrates why—because courts have seen
Aboriginal title as on a border between private law and public law.
The Canadian constitutional environment enhances these tendencies
in so far as Aboriginal title becomes explicitly a constitutional right,
rather than simply a common law property right, and then it is subjected to forms of reasoning applicable to constitutional rights.
For example, in Delgamuukw, the analysis of Aboriginal title is
subjected to a general Aboriginal rights test grounded in cultural considerations and to analysis for whether a particular doctrine on Aboriginal title furthers such constitutional purposes as
reconciliation.172 In Tsilhqot’in, Chief Justice McLachlin continues to
emphasize how Aboriginal title flows from unique constitutional
processes,173 rather than simply seeing it as flowing from prior possession of land that gives rise to property rights. Thus, the judicial
discourse on Aboriginal title specifically orients itself to cultural goals
and constitutional goals, which suggest that economic characteristics
of the property right at issue simply will not loom large.
However, on accounts that see the economic efficiency of the common law as arising more from mechanisms related to the litigation
process, central role of the parties, and stare decisis, there are further
reasons why Aboriginal property rights may develop differently than
property rights within the common law. A first distinguishing factor
is a relatively limited amount of case law. Lower court cases of any
consequence in this area are likely to be appealed, so it is principally
the Supreme Court of Canada’s decisions that will have any impact on
the developing doctrine. But, for instance, there have been only a

172. Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010 (Can.).
173. Tsilhqot’in Nation v. British Columba, [2014] 2 S.C.R. 256, para. 72 (Can.) (“The
characteristics of Aboriginal title flow from the special relationship between the
Crown and the Aboriginal group in question. It is this relationship that makes
Aboriginal title sui generis or unique. Aboriginal title is what it is—the unique
product of the historic relationship between the Crown and the Aboriginal group
in question.”).
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handful of Supreme Court of Canada cases on Aboriginal title.174 As
discussed earlier in the Article, these cases have seen meaningful
shifts in the doctrine, whether or not acknowledged by the court.175
There have simply not been enough cases to build up a stable doctrine
that is consistent from one case to the next.
A second distinguishing factor is the different incentives on the
parties compared to a standard common law context. Precisely because of the substantial nature of the shifts in the law over time in
this area, there may well be reasons for a potential litigant to wait to
bring a case in the hopes of having more favorable law—with the same
dynamics also delaying negotiation based on the law in some instances. Frankly, the costs of an Aboriginal title suit are massive, and
any such suit is essentially a one-time opportunity that has a massive
impact on the future of a particular community. There are simply not
incentives for parties to litigate repeatedly in the face of an economically inefficient rule as there are in other areas of common law property rights litigation.
A third factor is that such litigation may simply not be possible. In
respect of many areas of common law, cases present themselves that
enable testing of small, incremental aspects of various rules. In respect of Aboriginal title jurisprudence, every case is likely to engage
all of the issues, and no case in particular allows precise testing of one
particular facet of one rule. There will not readily be a case that enables testing the specific parameters of the doctrine without engaging
all issues at the same time, thus opening the scope for the courts to
engage in their generalized constitutional-reasoning processes that
could yet open more unpredictability.
If these sorts of factors do distinguish Aboriginal property rights as
not likely to be developed in an economically optimal way through the
courts, some other sorts of policy interventions become necessary.
Part V turns to some policy responses that could help to promote the
development of more economically useful property rights for Canadian
Indigenous communities.
V. POTENTIAL POLICY APPROACHES TO FURTHER MORE
ECONOMICALLY FUNCTIONAL INDIGENOUS
PROPERTY RIGHTS
If this Article ended with Part IV, it would offer only a pessimistic
argument. But there are, arguably, ways to try to move beyond the
dysfunction in which the shape of Aboriginal property rights, notably
174. Id.; Marshall and Bernard, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 220 (Can.); Guerin v. The Queen,
[1984] 2 S.C.R. 335 (Can.) (not being about Aboriginal title but containing some
discussion of it); Calder v. British Columbia, [1973] S.C.R. 313 (Can.).
175. See supra section III.A (discussing some of the shifts in precedent).
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Aboriginal title appears to remain trapped at present. A variety of
different actors have potentially accessible ways of attempting to shift
matters.
One proposed approach that has been floated recently by Canadian
scholar Tom Flanagan is for courts to take judicial notice of basic economic principles when adjudicating Aboriginal property rights
cases.176 This idea is interesting, and it might be accessible to the
courts. Given that courts at least often seek to develop other common
law principles with regard to economic efficiency, asking them to consider economic principles in this context does not ask them to do something radical, but to incrementally introduce certain considerations
into an area of jurisprudence that are currently relatively absent from
that context.
At the same time, one might ask why courts should take judicial
notice of basic economic principles, and whether they might be better
to receive argument or even expert evidence on the economic impacts
of developing the law in particular ways. But there is a plausible argument for courts to realize that they are inevitably enmeshed in policy making in this area, partly because their determinations on the
scope of property rights will then become constitutionally entrenched,
and that they should then take account of economic principles that
properly bear on the policy-making task in which they are engaged.
Flanagan seems to offer that approach as a suggestion to judges in
the hope that they will take it up, and that raises the question of how
to deal with the possibility that they will not do so on their own initiative in response to the suggestion. A statutorily mandated requirement of this sort could be legislatively possible, but it would likely be
controversial and would arguably differ from other evidentiary rules
currently prescribed for judges in seeming to mandate a particular
mode of thinking, on which some might thus raise judicial-independence concerns. So, this policy approach likely needs to be left to the
judges and thus to fate.
A second possible approach would consider some of the factors in
Part IV and seek to break up some of the reasons why adjudication is
not leading to economically useful property rights. To the extent that
one of the problems is simply legal uncertainty from matters not yet
being decided, an obvious response is to try to force the courts to consider those matters. More generally, getting the courts to consider
further cases on the scope of Aboriginal property rights might also be
a vehicle for putting before them policy and economic arguments on
why what they have currently done raises problems and then seeking
to offer some solutions in terms of accessible legal paths by which they
176. FLANAGAN, supra note 1.
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could move from their current legal position to legal positions with
more economically functional property rights.
In Canada, one important way in which matters can be put to the
courts is via the so-called “reference power.” The federal government
has the statutory ability to refer a legal question to the Supreme
Court of Canada for decision,177 and the provinces have the statutory
ability to refer a legal question to their respective Courts of Appeal,
with an appeal possible from such a reference decision.178 Governments could choose to send reference decisions to the courts to require
adjudication on some of the uncertain elements of Aboriginal title, and
because of their somewhat distinctive method of ending up before the
courts, any such cases would likely engage the various stakeholders
affected by the polycentric questions at play. Governments could then
take steps to push for resolution of some of the outstanding legal questions, while also engaging courts with more of the policy consequences
of the decisions they are making in this area. However, that approach
would also have the effect of further promoting judicial power in this
area.
In terms of a third possibility that may be emerging, there is also
arguably an increasing possibility for private parties to push matters
forward. Some recent cases that have been pursued by Aboriginal
communities directly against corporations have led to interesting judicial decisions that Aboriginal communities can sue private parties on
the basis of previously unproven Aboriginal title claims where they
can establish a common law tort against the private party, such as
nuisance, that arises from an impact on the potential Aboriginal title
lands.179 Such cases, the courts have held, can be litigated without
the government being a party on the Aboriginal title issue,180 although they have not precluded the companies from later seeking to
have governments added. This basic possibility exists because Aboriginal rights and title “pre-exist the declaration of their existence” and a
cause of action based on them thus “may exist before a declaration of
aboriginal title is made.”181
177. See Supreme Court Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. S-26, § 53 (Can.).
178. See, e.g., Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, § 8 (Ont.) (with § 8(1) stating
that “[t]he Lieutenant Governor in Council may refer any question to the Court of
Appeal for hearing and consideration” and § 8(7) stating that “[t]he opinion of the
court shall be deemed to be a judgment of the court and an appeal lies from it as
from a judgment in an action.”).
179. See Saik’uz First Nation v. Rio Tinto Alcan Inc., 2015 BCCA 154 (Can.);
Ominayak v. Penn W. Petroleum, 2015 ABQB 342 (Can.).
180. Saik’uz, 2015 BCCA 154; Ominayak, 2015 ABQB 342.
181. Ominayak, 2015 ABQB at para. 39; see also Saik’uz, 2015 BCCA at para. 66 (“As
any other litigant, they should be permitted to prove in the action against another party the rights that are required to be proved in order to succeed in the
claim against the other party.”).
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This is an interesting development because it opens some prospect
of direct litigation between Aboriginal communities and resource-development companies on a more widespread basis even during the interim phase of uncertainty about final rights, thus moving away from
the duty to consult as the principal legal tool managing that interim
phase. The result could well be that more companies could end up
with standing to litigate on Aboriginal property rights issues where
those affect their developments, and litigation might thus be pushed
further along in more of a traditional common law model. The presence of corporate litigants in the case—typically not a feature in the
leading title cases—would also help highlight to the courts the economic impacts of their decisions; however, it should be noted that
many of those have been on Aboriginal communities themselves and it
is in some respects unfortunate if it takes the presence of corporate
litigants to awaken courts to these considerations.
Lawsuits by companies seeking, for instance, declaratory relief to
clarify the scope of Aboriginal property rights that affect their operations are just one possible mode of corporate litigation that might ensue, and others have actually already begun to be realized.
Companies like Northern Superior have sued the Ontario government
for allegedly not meeting its consultation obligations and attempting
to download them informally onto industry.182 Cassiar Gold has filed
a claim against the British Columbia government for trading away
land on which the company held mineral rights to a First Nation
under a modern treaty without any notice to the company.183 Depending on the outcome of these types of lawsuits, corporate entities
may be able to generate additional pressures toward better definition
of Aboriginal property rights.
These are thus three reasonably accessible ways in which efforts
could be made to get Canadian courts to reconsider the economically
problematic characteristics of Aboriginal property rights as they have
developed them thus far. In doing so, economic theory would suggest
that the courts could enhance the economic prosperity of Canadian
Indigenous communities, quite possibly not at any expense to anyone,
but rather in achieving a Pareto gain. Thus far, out of a mix of reasons, litigation has not worked to develop a doctrine of Aboriginal title
with economically, fully functional characteristics. Aboriginal title
has developed with problems related to uncertainty, anticommons
182. See generally Dwight Newman, The Canadian Resource Sector’s Messy Duty to
Consult, FIN. POST (Oct. 29, 2015), http://business.financialpost.com/fp-comment/
the-canadian-resource-sectors-messy-duty-to-consult [https://perma.unl.edu/
B6BH-DX99] (discussing the Northern Superior lawsuit).
183. Derrick Penner, Gold Prospector Sues B.C. Over Transfer of Property Over Mineral Claims, VANCOUVER SUN (Feb. 1, 2016), http://www.vancouversun.com/life/
gold+prospector+sues+over+transfer+property+over+mineral+claims/11690876/
story.html [https://perma.unl.edu/A5L5-G68F].
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problems associated with the imposition of multiple decision makers,
and commons problems related to the supposedly inherently collective
form of the property right and imposed inalienability of the property
right. These characteristics have grown out of courts’ assumptions
about the form of right they should be creating and the lack of attention to private law considerations. The ways suggested to engage with
these problems try to find ways to challenge those underlying features
of the jurisprudence and to get it on a potentially different path.
Indigenous rights jurisprudence is both a tremendously challenging area of law and a tremendously important one. Questions of justice in respect of the historic wrongs done to Indigenous communities
call for sincere and rigorous efforts at appropriate responses. At the
same time, the design of those responses affects greatly the future
prospects for Indigenous communities and Indigenous individuals, as
well as broader economic prospects and natural resource strategy. If
judicial approaches in this area are designed in ways that are not attentive to property rights dimensions and economic dimensions, the
design of those responses can play out in economically suboptimal
ways that deprive Indigenous communities of the benefits of their
property rights.
These issues extend beyond Canada as well. Canada’s Aboriginal
title jurisprudence is part of a larger transnational jurisprudential
conversation on Indigenous property rights,184 which is also manifesting in very significant litigation on Indigenous rights and resource development in such other resource-rich states as Australia and Chile.
So, there are broader lessons to draw and other cases to study in future research. Some of the other states facing these issues have notably different constitutional contexts. For example, after early common
law Aboriginal title decisions, Australia developed a statutory framework on Aboriginal title without constitutionalizing it,185 and the
question could be pursued as to whether non-Indigenous legislators
did any better than judges in terms of the economic characteristics of
Aboriginal title, and why or why not.
The larger judicial conversation present on these topics is, in turn,
part of a broader effort to face up to historical legacies of colonialism.
Legal decisions that undermine the value of rights assigned to communities harmed by colonialism perpetuate further and entirely unnecessary wrongs. The long history of colonialism has been one of
restrictions on the economic activity of Indigenous communities and
on economic uses of Indigenous lands.186 Aspects of the decisions of
184. See generally MCHUGH, ABORIGINAL TITLE, supra note 13.
185. See generally RICHARD H. BARTLETT, NATIVE TITLE IN AUSTRALIA (3d ed. 2015).
186. See, e.g., BANNER, supra note 4; TOM FLANAGAN ET AL., BEYOND THE INDIAN ACT:
RESTORING ABORIGINAL PROPERTY RIGHTS (2010); MILLER, supra note 8.
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well-meaning, progressive judges may now tragically be extending
and expanding upon those colonial legacies.
From the standpoint of new scholarly directions, there needs to be
much more economic analysis of developing approaches to Indigenous
property rights and related matters. Such analysis has real potential
to contribute to Pareto preferable, or “win-win,” outcomes. The economic characteristics of Indigenous property rights matter to Indigenous communities and to the degree to which their property rights are
being respected through the approaches that courts are adopting.
Those who care about Indigenous communities need to care about economics. They also need to recognize the limitations of certain approaches to adjudication in grappling with the economic
characteristics of Indigenous property rights.

